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I. Introduction
This thesis contains three separate papers that deal with various aspects
of organization theory and personnel economics. The first paper, which
is joint work with Frank Rosar from University of Bonn, considers the
impact of delegation of authority on the motivation of agents. The second
paper is joint work with Emmanuelle Auriol from Toulouse School of
Economics. It analyzes the impact of negative intrinsic motivation on
the optimal labor contracts in profit- and mission-oriented organizations.
And finally the third paper asks the question how workers should be
assigned to jobs if they possess multidimensional skills that are of varying
importance in different jobs.
In the following, a short overview over each paper is given, before the
papers are presented in more detail in Chapter II to IV.
I.1. Authority and Motivation
In the first paper, we consider situations where two parties, a principal
and an agent, have to find an agreement on the choice of a project, and
analyze how decision rights should be optimally allocated between the
two parties.
The importance of this question has, among others, been pointed out
in a seminal paper by Aghion and Tirole (1997) who analyze how delega-
tion of authority influences both parties’ incentives to acquire information
on the possible projects and their payoffs. By contrast, we assume that
all project payoffs are common knowledge, but the extent to which the
players are willing to accept compromises concerning the project choice
is their private information. We thus consider a complementary problem
to the one described in Aghion and Tirole (1997).
2In our setup, authority consists of two components: the authority to
initiate or choose a project, and the authority to approve or implement a
project. That is, who gets to pick a project, and who has the final decision
right on whether the project is going to be realized or not. The principal
allocates both tasks in the beginning of the game to either himself or
the agent. We assume that the principal and the agent, a priori, favor
different projects, but in order to complete the project successfully, they
will have to find a compromise for which both are willing to provide
effort.
In the first part of the paper, we analyze a situation where the prin-
cipal keeps the authority to approve, but may delegate the authority to
initiate a project to the agent. We show that delegating the authority
over the project choice can have a motivating effect on the agent as he
is able to choose a project for which he is also willing to provide effort.
However, delegation of authority may also have a discouraging effect on
the agent, in particular if he is unsure about whether the principal is go-
ing to accept his project choice. Even if the project is mutually beneficial
with positive probability, the agent may not be willing to provide effort
when he is afraid that his effort investment will be lost.
In the second part of the paper, we go one step further and try to
disentangle the different authority components by also endogenizing the
allocation of the authority to approve a project. We find that under
certain circumstances, the principal will give all authority to the agent,
i.e., both the authority to initiate and to approve a project. He thus can
avoid the discouraging effect of delegation that arises when the agent can
initiate a project but when he is not sure whether it will be implemented.
However, the more likely the principal is to approve the agent’s choice, the
more the latter will try to push his own preferred project, thus lowering
the principal’s utility. A principal who is more willing to compromise
hence risks that the agent takes advantage of this circumstance. As a
consequence, a principal who is more flexible with respect to the project
choice will actually cede less authority to the agent.
3I.2. The Good, the Bad, and the Ordinary
In this paper, we analyze how different sources of intrinsic motivation of
workers may affect labor management and the production outcomes both
in for-profit and nonprofit organizations.
Most theoretical models on intrinsic motivation suppose that it arises
if workers derive a benefit from doing good or if they are interested in a
certain mission, such as helping the poor or protecting the environment.
However, workers may be motivated by many other aspects of a job which
are not necessarily beneficial for the employer or society. For instance, a
pedophile might be interested in working with children, especially if he
faces a low risk of being exposed; a spy will prefer jobs where he can get
his hands on sensitive information; and a terrorist might want to work
in an airport to have a privileged access to planes.
To account for such different sources of motivation, we assume that
there are three types of workers, who care for different things: regular
workers only care about monetary incentives, good workers care about
money and the mission of the organization, and bad workers care about
money and whether they can do things they like, but which are harm-
ful to the organization or society. We then consider two sectors of the
economy, one profit-oriented and one mission-oriented. As in Besley and
Ghatak (2005), on which our model is based, we assume that in the
nonprofit sector, organizations are structured around some mission, for
example providing public services, or catering to the needs of disadvan-
taged groups of society.1 These organizations may attract workers who
care about this specific mission and derive an intrinsic benefit from their
work. They can hence offer lower extrinsic incentives and still attract
motivated workers. We further generalize the approach by Besley and
Ghatak (2005) by introducing “bad” workers and adding monitoring as
an additional choice variable of the employer in order to deal with the
1We use the terms mission-oriented and nonprofit organization equivalently since
we believe them to be largely congruent in reality. However, there are cases where
organizations do not have the legal status of a nonprofit, but still follow a mission.
For a further discussion of this, see Besley and Ghatak (2005).
4different incentive issues raised by the presence of different kinds of work-
ers: while monitoring reinforces the effort incentives of good and regular
workers, it makes “bad” actions or anti-social behavior less attractive as
it increases the chances of getting caught and being punished.
Given this setup, we first consider the case with only good and regular
workers and find the classic result that the mission-oriented sector offers
lower wages and makes less use of monitoring than the profit-oriented
sector. We then introduce bad workers who derive utility from behaving
in an anti-social way. It turns out that profit-oriented organizations are
a priori less vulnerable to such behavior. Bad workers may behave like
regular workers in the profit-oriented sector and thus be totally undis-
tinguishable from “normal” people. By contrast, if they join the mission-
oriented sector, then only in order to follow their destructive instincts.
The more organizations in this sector rely on the intrinsic motivation
of good workers and the less they make use of monetary incentives and
control, the more likely they are to become the target of bad workers.
We then analyze how contracts have to change in both sectors in order
to deter bad workers from their destructive behavior. However, deter-
rence is costly as it implies higher monitoring, and it even may become
entirely ineffective for workers with very high levels of bad motivation.
We therefore also consider ex ante measures of candidate selection, which
may help to reduce the occurrence of anti-social behavior.
I.3. Job Assignment with Multivariate Skills
The third paper asks the question under which circumstances the perfor-
mance in one job can be a useful selection criterion for another job when
workers’ skills are distributed along several dimensions and jobs require
different skills to a varying extent.
Using a simple model with two activities and two skills that are of
different importance for each of the activities, I derive optimal assign-
ment rules for old and new workers. The paper shows that there may be
a tradeoff between short-term and long-term output maximization when
new workers are hired for two periods: in the short run, output is max-
5imized by assigning new workers to the task where the expected output
of an unscreened worker is maximal. But especially if this task plays
a much more important role in the overall production of the firm, the
employer may prefer to first hire workers for the other task, which is thus
used as a screening stage for maximizing output in the long run. That
is, the employer will prefer to forego some first period output in order to
make more informed choices in the long run.
However, the firm may not always be in a situation where it can assign
any number of workers to any task. At least in the short run, it is likely
to face slot constraints in the sense that it has a fixed number of jobs
concerned with either of the two tasks. If this is the case, reassignment
rules will change with the consequence that workers may end up working
in a job where they are likely to be less productive. That is, a variant of
the Peter Principle may hold which states that workers get promoted up
to their level of incompetence. In this model, workers may get reassigned
to a different job even though they are likely to be less“competent” in this
job. Yet, the employer will prefer this to hiring a new worker on whom
he has no information. The Peter Principle would, thus, be a by-product
of a labor market where it is difficult to assess workers’ characteristics.
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II. Authority and Motivation
II.1. Introduction
There are many situations where a principal and an agent have to realize
a project together that requires both parties’ effort even though they
have opposing interests as to which project to choose.
Consider, for example, the decision problem faced by a manufacturer
and a supplier: While the former is interested in buying high quality
goods, the latter can increase his profits by lowering his costs at the
detriment of quality. In order to do business with each other, they will
have to find an agreement that suits both and induces both firms to
provide effort. The same would also be true for co–authors with opposing
interests regarding the writing style or focus of their paper.
With scenarios such as these in mind, we analyze the effect of the
allocation of decision rights on both players’ motivation to conduct the
chosen project. We assume that both players are symmetric except for
the fact that one player has a somewhat stronger position which allows
him to decide who has the authority to select a project and– in the
second part of the paper– also how the work on the project should be
organized. In the first example above, the stronger player could be the
manufacturing firm who would thus take the role of the principal, whereas
the supplier would be in the weaker position of the agent. Likewise, in
the second example, the coauthors might be a professor (the principal)
who writes a paper with his student (the agent). Given that the principal
and the agent in each of these examples favor a different project, we ask
how the principal should allocate decision rights. Should he let the agent
choose a project? This may induce the agent to work harder, but it also
increases the chances that the chosen project is not the one favored by
8the principal. And to what extent should the principal try to keep the
final control over the project implementation?
To answer these questions, we propose a model which is related to
the seminal paper by Aghion and Tirole (1997) who have pointed out
the importance of the allocation of decision rights on motivation. A
priori, the agent and the principal in our model favor different projects.
While they are aware of this basic conflict of interest, they do not know
how flexible the other player is concerning the project choice. That is,
their respective willingness to compromise is their private information.
Yet, in order to complete the project successfully, both players have to
agree on the project choice and be willing to contribute their effort.
We then analyze the effect of the allocation of authority on both
players’ motivation to work on the chosen project. In order to do so,
we differentiate between two components of authority: the authority to
initiate or choose a project, and the authority to approve or implement a
project. That is, who gets to pick a project, and who has the final decision
right on whether the project is going to be realized or not. The principal
allocates both tasks in the beginning of the game to either himself or the
agent.
In the first part of the paper, we analyze a situation where the prin-
cipal keeps the authority to approve, but may delegate the authority to
initiate a project to the agent. We show that delegating the authority
over the project choice can have a motivating effect on the agent as he
is able to choose a project for which he is also willing to provide effort.
However, delegation of authority may also have a discouraging effect on
the agent, in particular if he is unsure about whether the principal is go-
ing to accept his project choice. Even if the project is mutually beneficial
with positive probability, the agent may not be willing to provide effort
when he is afraid that his effort investment will be lost.
In the second part of the paper, we go one step further and try to
disentangle the different authority components by also endogenizing the
allocation of the authority to approve a project. We find that under
certain circumstances, the principal will give all authority to the agent,
i.e., both the authority to initiate and to approve a project. He thus can
9avoid the discouraging effect of delegation that arises when the agent can
initiate a project but cannot implement it. However, the more likely the
principal is to approve the agent’s choice, the more the latter will try
to push his own favorite project, thus lowering the principal’s utility. A
principal who is more willing to compromise hence risks that the agent
takes advantage of this circumstance. As a consequence, a principal who
is more flexible with respect to the project choice will actually cede less
authority to the agent.
There is a large literature on the effects of delegation in various set-
tings. For instance, one strand of the literature considers situations
where the agent has information which is payoff-relevant for the prin-
cipal, who therefore might want to delegate decisions to the agent in
order to take advantage of his information. Examples are the papers
by Holmstro¨m (1977), Alonso and Matouschek (2007), and Alonso and
Matouschek (2008).1 By contrast, in the setting we consider, neither
the principal and nor the agent have information on the project which is
directly payoff-relevant for the other.
In this respect, our paper differs also from the paper by Aghion and
Tirole (1997), who analyze how delegation of authority influences both
parties’ incentives to acquire information on the possible project pay-
offs. That is, they analyze a problem where the effort decision affects
the project choice. By contrast, in our paper the project choice affects
the motivation to provide effort such that causality is basically reversed.
We are thus interested in a problem which is complementary to the one
considered in Aghion and Tirole (1997). We find that the reversed time
structure together with some further differences2 may lead to delegation
having qualitatively different effects on motivation. In particular, while
delegation has a positive effect on motivation in Aghion and Tirole (1997),
there are countervailing effects in our paper. Thus, our paper helps to
1The same is true for papers building on the model first presented by Crawford and
Sobel (1982), as for instance Dessein (2002). However, these models usually do not
incorporate effort and hence provide no results concerning the motivation of workers.
2In particular, effort is complementary instead of substitutive and the nature of
private information differs.
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understand better some further aspects of the relationship between the
allocation of authority and motivation.
There are some other papers on delegation that consider a similar
structure as we do. In particular, the timing of actions in these papers
is similar, in that effort is spent only after a project has been chosen.
Whether delegation of the project choice occurs or not then has an im-
pact on some subsequent game. Examples are the papers by Aghion,
Dewatripont, and Rey (2004) and Zabojnik (2002).3 The latter paper
is closer to our analysis as it builds on a similar notion of motivation.
Yet its focus is on how delegation may help save on high-powered incen-
tives. Also in this class of models are the papers by Bester and Kra¨hmer
(2008) and Bester (2009), the latter of which allows for a conflict of in-
terest, since a higher payoff for the principal causes higher costs for the
agent.
Furthermore, by considering different components of authority we go
beyond much of the existing literature which usually focuses on delegation
of the project choice, but does not take into account other components
of authority. Some notable exceptions are the papers by Van den Steen
(2007) and Landier, Sraer, and Thesmar (2009) who also explicitly model
the implementation decision.4
The paper is organized as follows: the next section outlines the ba-
sic model, where the principal may delegate the authority to initiate a
project to the agent, but keeps the authority to approve. This basic
model is analyzed in Section II.3. In Section II.4, we then look at what
happens if we change the game structure such that the agent instead of
the principal has the authority to approve a project. In Section II.5, the
different resulting authority structures are compared and the principal’s
3Aghion, Dewatripont, and Rey (2004) introduce the notion of transferable but not
contractible control. Zabojnik (2002) shows that if workers are liquidity constrained,
it may be less costly to motivate workers by letting them work on their own ideas,
even if the manager is better informed.
4In particular the paper by Landier, Sraer, and Thesmar (2009) is related to our
analysis, but unlike in our model, the results are driven by the fact that one player
has better information about the state of the world than the other.
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choice of authority allocation is endogenized. Section II.6 concludes.
II.2. The Model
We consider a setting where a principal P and an agent A want to realize a
project together. Both parties have diverging preferences over the project
choice, and the project is only realized if the agent provides positive effort
and the principal approves the chosen project.5
Projects. There are two projects k = 1, 2. The principal P prefers
project k = 1, the agent A prefers project k = 2. These preferences are
common knowledge, however it is private information, how much player
i = A, P dislikes his less preferred project. Their respective project
valuations vik are as follows:
Project valuation vik i = P i = A
Project k = 1 B αb
Project k = 2 βB b
The parameters α, β ∈ [0, 1] measure the extent to which the prefer-
ences of the two parties are aligned.6 We interpret them as the respective
player’s willingness to compromise on the project choice. The higher for
example α, the higher is the utility that the agent derives from his less
preferred project, i.e., the more likely he is willing to compromise about
this project.7 We assume that both parameters can be either high or low,
i.e. α ∈ {α, α¯} and β ∈ {β, β¯}. The probability that player i = A, P has
a high type is qi. With probability 1− qi, he is of a low type.
5In order to make our analysis easier to compare, we use largely a similar notation
as in Aghion and Tirole (1997).
6This is similar to the model of Aghion and Tirole (1997), except that there the
congruence parameters are common knowledge whereas in our model they are private
information.
7The analogue reasoning applies to the principal’s willingness to compromise β.
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Effort. The agent and the principal can either provide effort or not,
i.e. ei ∈ {0, 1}. For the project to be successful, both players i = A, P
have to provide effort ei = 1. Their cost of effort is given by ci > 0.
Utility. Both i = A, P get utility uik = vik · eA · eP − ci · ei from
realizing project k = 1, 2 where vik is player i’s valuation of project k as
given by the table above. That is, the players’ actions eA, eP are strict
complements.
We assume that all types of players get the highest utility from their
preferred project. Only high types (i.e., who have a willingness to com-
promise α¯, respectively β¯) derive positive utility from the other player’s
preferred project, whereas low types (α, β) will only want to realize their
own preferred project. This means, the following has to hold:
Assumption 1: We assume that b− cA > α¯b− cA > 0 > αb− cA, and
B − cP > β¯B − cP > 0 > βB − cP .
As a consequence, it is only possible to find a mutually beneficial
project if at least one of the two players is of a high type. The following
table gives an overview over which projects give a positive payoff to both
players, given the types of the agent and the principal:
Possible projects α α¯
β - k = 1
β¯ k = 2 k = 1, 2
Authority. For the time being, we only consider how the authority
to initiate should be allocated, whereas the authority to approve stays
with the principal. In Section II.4, we consider the opposite case where
the agent always has the authority to approve. In Section II.5, we finally
endogenize the allocation of both authority components.
Information. As noted above, the players’ willingness to compromise
α and β, respectively, is their private information. They learn this in-
formation only after stage 1 of the game, i.e., after it has been decided
13


















Figure II.1: Timing of events.
who is going to choose a project. The preferences over the projects as
described in the above tables, the players’ project valuation and utility
functions, as well as the respective probabilities that the players are of a
high type are common knowledge.
Timing. The timing of the game, as also represented in Fig. II.1, is
as follows:
(1) Allocation of authority to initiate: The principal assigns authority
for the project choice to a ∈ {A, P}.
(-) The agent and the principal learn their own willingness to compro-
mise α and β, respectively.
(2) Project choice: Player a chooses project k ∈ {1, 2}.
(3) Agent’s effort decision: The agent chooses his effort level eA ∈
{0, 1}.
(4) Principal’s effort decision (Implementation stage): The principal
chooses his effort level eP ∈ {0, 1}.
Note that the last two steps are reversed in Section II.4: then the agent
gets to decide last and hence has the power to approve or veto the chosen
project. In Section II.5, the choice between these two game structures is
endogenized.
Solution concept. We adopt the notion of perfect Bayesian equilib-
rium.
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II.3. The Principal has the Authority to Approve
In this section we first analyze the optimal allocation of authority over
the project choice when the principal keeps the authority to approve the
project, i.e., when he keeps the last word in the matter.
We solve the game by backwards induction. Let us start with the
case where the agent A has the authority to choose a project.
II.3.1. The Agent Initiates a Project
At the last stage of the game, the principal can observe the project and
effort choice of the agent. If the latter has provided effort, the principal
will choose effort eP = 1 if his favorite project k = 1 is chosen, or if k = 2
and his willingness to compromise is high, i.e., if P is of type β¯.
Anticipating this behavior, the expected utility of the agent if he
chooses k = 1, i.e., his less preferred project, is
E[uA|k = 1] = eA(αb− cA) . (II.1)
That is, he can be sure that the principal is going to approve the choice
and provide effort. By contrast, if the agent chooses his own preferred
project k = 2, the principal will only approve with probability qP , i.e., if
his type is β¯. The agent’s expected utility therefore is
E[uA|k = 2] = eA(qP b− cA) . (II.2)
Optimal project choice. Comparing these two options, we find that
the agent optimally chooses project k = 1 if α > qP and k = 2 otherwise.
Optimal effort choice. The agent provides effort if he gets positive
expected utility from the optimal project. In case α > qP , the agent
provides effort if α > cA/b. In case α < qP , he provides effort if qP > cA/b.
Otherwise the agent’s optimal effort choice is eA = 0.
We thus obtain the following cases:
Case A1: qP ≤ α
If qP ≤ α then (II.1) is greater than (II.2) and hence all types of agents
optimally choose the principal’s preferred project k = 1. However, only
agents of type α¯ can get a positive utility from this choice and are willing
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to provide effort. Payoffs for the different types of principals and agents
hence can be summarized as follows:
vP , vA α α¯
β 0,0 B − cP , α¯b− cA
β¯ 0,0 B − cP , α¯b− cA
From an ex ante point of view, i.e., before the players learn their
respective types, the expected payoff of the principal therefore is
E[uP ] = qA(B − cP ) .
The expected payoff of the agent is ex ante
E[uA] = qA(α¯b− cA) .
Case A2: α < qP ≤ cA/b
In this case, low type agents (α = α) prefer project k = 2. However,
the probability that the principal is going to approve this choice is too
low to make it worthwhile for the agent to provide effort. High types of
agents (α = α¯) prefer k = 1 and provide effort. As a consequence, the
payoff matrix and the ex ante expected payoffs in this case are identical
to the previous one.
Case A3: cA/b < qP ≤ α¯
As in the previous case, low type agents prefer project k = 2, but
now the probability of getting through with this choice is actually high
enough, so that also the effort level is positive. If the agent is of a high
type, his optimal behavior is as in the previous case, i.e., he chooses k = 1
and eA = 1. Hence payoffs are as follows:
vP , vA α α¯
β 0,−cA B − cP , α¯b− cA
β¯ β¯B − cP ,b− cA B − cP , α¯b− cA
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Cases A1 A2 A3 A4
α types eA = 0 eA = 1, k = 2 eA = 1, k = 2
α¯ types eA = 1, k = 1 eA = 1, k = 1 eA = 1, k = 2
Figure II.2: Agents’ effort and project choice under AP-authority, given
qP .
This leads to the following ex ante expected payoffs:
E[uP ] = qA(B − cP ) + (1− qA)qP (β¯B − cP ) ,
E[uA] = qA(α¯b− cA) + (1− qA)qP (b− cA) + (1− qA)(1− qP )(−cA) .
Case A4: α¯ < qP
In this case, the probability that the principal is of a high type and
that he will therefore eventually approve even of his less preferred project
k = 2 is so large that the agent will choose k = 2 and provide effort, no
matter what his own type is. The payoffs can then be summarized as:
vP , vA α α¯
β 0,−cA 0, −cA
β¯ β¯B − cP ,b− cA β¯B − cP , b− cA
The ex ante expected payoffs of the two players are:
E[uP ] = qP (β¯B − cP ) ,
E[uA] = qP b− cA .
Summing up these cases, we get the following results, as shown in
Figure II.2: For low values of qP (qP < cA/b, cases A1 and A2), i.e., if
the probability that the principal is willing to compromise on the project
choice is low, then only high type agents (α = α¯) provide effort. To make
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sure that a project is realized, they will choose the principal’s preferred
project, k = 1. Low type agents (α = α) who are inflexible on the
project choice, are too afraid that their effort will be in vain even though
for qP > 0 there is a positive probability that even project k = 2 will go
through. They hence prefer to do nothing and get zero payoff rather than
to incur the cost of effort and possibly make a loss. That is, delegation
of authority has a discouraging effect here.
In the intermediate range of values of qP (cA/b ≤ qP < α¯, case A3),
this discouraging effect of delegation disappears. Now, even low type
agents find it worthwhile to provide effort.8 High type agents continue
to choose the principal’s preferred project. Therefore delegation has a
motivating effect in this range of values and the principal actually gets
his first-best outcome: agents always provide effort, and whenever it is
possible (i.e., whenever α = α¯) the principal’s preferred project is chosen.
Finally, for high values of qP (α¯ ≤ qP , case A4), the probability that
P is of a high type and that A hence can push through his preferred
project is so high, that all types of agents choose their preferred project
k = 2. That is, they take advantage of the principal’s flexibility and
hence we speak of an exploitation effect.
II.3.2. The Principal Initiates a Project
Let us now consider what happens if the principal picks the project him-
self, i.e., if he has both the authority to initiate and to approve a project.
As before, at the last stage of the game, the principal knows which
project has been chosen and whether the agent has provided effort. The
principal will choose effort eP = 1 if his favorite project k = 1 is chosen
or if k = 2 and his willingness to compromise is high, i.e., if P is of type
β¯.
If P chooses A’s preferred project k = 2 he can be sure that A will
8Of course, due to Assumption 1, they still choose project k = 2 as this is the only
project from which they get a positive payoff.
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provide effort, leaving P with payoff
E[uP |k = 2] =
{
β¯B − cP if β = β¯
0 if β = β
,
whereas P ’s expected payoff if he chooses k = 1 is
E[uP |k = 1] = qA(B − cP ) ,
i.e., his payoff from project k = 1 times the probability that A is a high
type and hence willing to accept this project.
Optimal project choice. From this follows that the principal optimally
chooses his preferred project k = 1 if he is of low type β, because his
expected payoff otherwise is zero. If he is of a high type, he also chooses
k = 1 as long as qA > (β¯B − cP )/(B − cP ), if this choice yields a higher
expected payoff. Otherwise the principal should choose the agent’s pre-
ferred project k = 2.
Hence, under P-authority we get two cases:
Case P1: qA >
β¯B−cP
B−cP
In this case, the probability that the agent will provide effort even for
his less preferred project, i.e., that he is of type α¯, is so high that the
principal will always go for his own favorite project k = 1 which leads to
the following payoffs:
vP , vA α α¯
β 0,0 B − cP , α¯b− cA
β¯ 0,0 B − cP , α¯b− cA
From an ex ante point of view, the principal and the agent respectively
get an expected payoff
E[uP ] = qA(B − cP ) ,
E[uA] = qA(α¯b− cA) .




If, however, the probability that the agent is willing to compromise on
the project choice is low, then only low types of principals will pick their
favorite project k = 1. High types will prefer to play it safe and pick the
agent’s favorite project k = 2 to make sure that the agent provides effort
and a project is actually realized in the end. Payoffs then are given by:
vP , vA α α¯
β 0,0 B − cP , α¯b− cA
β¯ β¯B − cP , b− cA β¯B − cP , b− cA
The ex ante expected payoffs therefore are
E[uP ] = qP (β¯B − cP ) + (1− qP )qA(B − cP ) ,
E[uA] = qP (b− cA) + (1− qP )qA(α¯b− cA) .
So, again summing up the different cases, we get the following results:
When qA is higher than some critical level
q˜A = (β¯B − cP )/(B − cP ) , (II.3)
i.e., if the probability that the agent is of a high type is high enough
(case P1), then the principal will always choose his own preferred project.
Although this gives him a higher payoff if the agent indeed has a high
type, the principal also runs the risk that no project will be realized if
the agent is of a low type in which case both players get zero payoffs.
On the other hand, when qA (case P2) is smaller than the critical
level q˜A, then high types of principals prefer to pick the agent’s favorite
project in order to make sure that some project is realized.
So overall, by choosing the project himself, a high typed principal
faces a risk of coordination failure: in the first case by choosing k = 1
although there is a positive chance that this choice will not be accepted
by A, and in the second case by choosing k = 2 although there is a









































When does the principal prefer to keep the authority to initiate a project
and when does he delegate this task to the agent? To answer this ques-
tion, we have to compare the expected payoffs of the principal, given both
players’ probability to be willing to compromise on the project choice.
In the previous section we identified several cases which are shown
graphically in Fig. II.3. When comparing the two forms of governance
we therefore can identify six areas, as displayed in Fig. II.4.9 Table II.1
and II.2 summarize the expected ex ante payoffs of the two players for
9Recall that the ex ante expected payoffs in cases A1 and A2 are the same, so we
can treat this as just one case.
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Authority
Area to E[uP ]
initiate
I A qA(B − cP )
P qA(B − cP )
II A qA(B − cP )
P qP (β¯B − cP ) + (1− qP )qA(B − cP )
III A qA(B − cP ) + (1− qA)qP (β¯B − cP )
P qA(B − cP )
IV A qA(B − cP ) + (1− qA)qP (β¯B − cP )
P qP (β¯B − cP ) + (1− qP )qA(B − cP )
V A qP (β¯B − cP )
P qA(B − cP )
V I A qP (β¯B − cP )
P qP (β¯B − cP ) + (1− qP )qA(B − cP )
Table II.1: P’s expected utility under A- and P-authority to initiate a
project in areas I-VI.
each of these areas as calculated above.
When looking at Table II.1, it is easy to see that the principal is
indifferent between the two authority structures in area I. In area II, as
well as in areas V and V I, he prefers P-Authority, although for different
reasons, whereas he prefers A-authority in areas III and IV . For the
detailed calculations see Appendix A.
What’s the intuition behind this? As we have seen in Section II.3.1,
delegation of the authority to initiate a project has a motivating effect on
the agent. By leaving the project choice to the agent, the principal can
be sure that the former always provides effort and whenever possible (i.e.,
if α = α¯) chooses the principal’s pet project k = 1. This minimizes the
risk of coordination failure between the two players and actually provides
the principal with his best possible outcome: whenever a compromise is
possible, it will be achieved in his favor.





I A qA(α¯b− cA)
P qA(α¯b− cA)
II A qA(α¯b− cA)
P qP (b− cA) + (1− qP )qA(α¯b− cA)
III A qA(α¯b− cA) + (1− qA)qP (b− cA)
+(1− qA)(1− qP )(−cA)
P qA(α¯b− cA)
IV A qA(α¯b− cA) + (1− qA)qP (b− cA)
+(1− qA)(1− qP )(−cA)
P qP (b− cA) + (1− qP )qA(α¯b− cA)
V A qP b− cA
P qA(α¯b− cA)
V I A qP b− cA
P qP (b− cA) + (1− qP )qA(α¯b− cA)
Table II.2: A’s expected utility under A- and P-authority to initiate a
project in areas I-VI.
(namely for cA/b ≤ qP < α¯), whereas for extreme values, the negative
effects of delegation dominate: On the one hand, if the principal’s ex-
pected willingness to compromise qP is too low (qP < cA/b), then too
little effort is provided as agents cannot be sure that their project choice
is going to be implemented by the principal in the end (discouraging ef-
fect of delegation). But if the principal chooses the project himself, then
the agent can be sure about implementation. He then knows that his
effort will not be spent in vain.
On the other hand, if the principal’s expected willingness to compro-
mise qP is too high (qP ≥ α¯), then the agent never chooses the principal’s
preferred project. The latter therefore prefers to pick a project himself.
Similarly, from table II.2, we can see that the agent is also indifferent


































Figure II.5: Preferred authority structure by areas.
in areas III and V , whereas he would prefer P-authority in areas II, IV
and V I.10 Except for areas IV and V the agent therefore prefers the
same authority structure as the principal.
What is the intuition behind the agent’s preferences over authority
structures? If qA < q˜A, the agent has a low willingness to compromise.
In this case, if the principal picks the project, he is going to choose k = 2
to increase the chances that the agent agrees and provides effort. Hence,
under P-authority the agent is likely to get his preferred project and he
can be sure that this project is implemented, whereas this is not the case
under A-authority. If qA > q˜A, then the agent has a high willingness to
compromise. Knowing this, the principal is more likely to pick his own
preferred project. So the agent gets a better project if he decides himself,
although he faces the risk of non-implementation. Yet, the higher qP the
more likely is the principal to agree. Hence, A-authority is overall better
for the agent in this area.
The results are summarized in Figure II.5. The letters indicate the
player who chooses the project.
10As before, see Appendix A for detailed calculations.
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II.3.4. Comparative Statics
How does the scope of delegation change with the parameters of our
model?
Suppose α¯ is close to one, i.e., a high type agent is almost indifferent
between the two projects or, in other words, the preferences of the prin-
cipal and the high type agent are nearly congruent. The range of values
of qP for which the agent would take advantage of the principal under
A-authority (i.e., the area to the right of α¯ in Figure II.5) then almost
disappears. Being almost indifferent between the two projects, the agent
rather tries to make sure to get the principal’s approval and hence chooses
P ’s preferred project k = 1. Exploitative behavior no longer plays a role,
but the motivating effect of delegation dominates, and hence A-authority
is optimal within a broader range from the principal’s point of view (cf.
Figure II.5(a)). If, on the other hand, the congruence of preferences be-
tween the principal and the high type agent is low, i.e., if α¯ close to
cA/b,
11 then there is almost no room for delegation, because its negative
effects from the principal’s point of view - the discouraging effect on one
side, and the risk of exploitative behavior by the agent on the other -
become too important.
When β¯ is close to one, i.e., a high type principal is almost indifferent
between the two projects, then the critical value q˜A = (β¯B − cP )/(B −
cP ) goes to one. This has no impact on the principal’s preferences over
authority structures. It does however influence the agent’s view of things:
If the principal is almost indifferent between the two projects, he is likely
to pick the agent’s preferred project just to assure its realization. Since
the agent thus obtains his first best outcome whenever compromise is
possible at all, he actually is happy to leave the authority to initiate to
the principal (cf. Figure II.5(b)).
Another parameter that influences the scope for delegation is the size
of the agent’s effort cost relative to his project valuation. If cA is close to
b, then the area where the discouraging effect of delegation dominates,
i.e. the area left of cA/b, becomes larger. By contrast, if cA is close to
11Due to Assumption 1, it cannot be smaller.
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Figure II.6: Timing of the reversed game.
zero, then the discouraging effect of delegation vanishes. In that case,
the agent incurs no cost of effort and hence has nothing to lose in case
that the principal does not approve of the chosen project.
II.4. Reversing the Game Structure: The Agent has the Authority to
Approve
So far, we have considered only under which circumstances the principal
wants to delegate the project choice to the agent, i.e., when he wants
to give him the authority to initiate a project. Yet, there is a second
component of authority in our model, namely the authority to approve
and implement a project. In the previous section, the principal always
kept this part of authority. However, there might be circumstances under
which the principal would also delegate this second authority component
to the agent, or alternatively where he would want to keep the control
over the project choice, but leave implementation to the agent.
Formally, this scenario can be described by reversing the timing of
the game in the following way, as also shown in Figure II.6:
(1) Allocation of authority: The principal assigns authority for the
project choice to a ∈ {A, P}.
(2) Project choice: Player a chooses project k ∈ {1, 2}.
(3) Principal’s effort choice: The principal chooses his effort level eP ∈
{0, 1}.
(4) Agent’s effort choice: The agent chooses his effort level eA ∈ {0, 1}.
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That is, the principal leaves the final decision over the project, i.e. the
authority to approve, to the agent by letting him have the final say in the
matter. Now, given this reversed timing, when does the principal prefer
to pick the project himself, and when does he also allocate the authority
to initiate to the agent?
Since the utility functions of the two players are symmetric, we can
solve the reversed game by using the solution of the previous game and
just changing the indices.12 Proceeding as in the previous section in
order to compare the players’ expected utility levels, we get the results
as depicted in Figure II.7.
Given that the agent has the authority to implement the project, i.e.,
that he moves last, how will the principal allocate the authority to initiate
a project? As it turns out, the principal prefers to give all authority to
the agent when qP is below some critical value
q˜P = (α¯b− cA)/(b− cA) . (II.4)
He thus can exploit the motivating effect of delegation, without having to
deal with its discouraging effect : agents will always choose a project for
which they are willing to provide effort. Also, when possible, they will
rather choose the principal’s preferred project, given that his expected
willingness to compromise qP is relatively low. However, since the agent
has to choose effort only after the principal, the agent is no longer afraid
that his effort may be spent in vain. In the worst case, the principal will
not agree with the agent’s choice and choose eP = 0, thus leaving both
players with zero payoff. But in contrast to before, the agent never incurs
a loss.
If qP ≥ q˜P , on the other hand, the principal prefers to pick a project
himself, because otherwise he would never get his preferred project. That
is, by keeping the authority to initiate a project, the principal can avoid
the exploitation effect.




























































Figure II.8: Different cases when either A or P has authority to imple-
ment
II.5. Endogenizing the Allocation of Authority
Given the results from the two previous sections, when does the principal
prefer which game? To answer this question we have to compare the
principal’s payoff in each game.
To get a clearer picture, Figure II.8 summarizes the different cases,
I-VI being the cases from Section II.3.3 and VII to XII from Section II.4.
Table II.3 summarizes the principal’s preferred authority structure
and his payoff given this authority structure in each of these cases. The
first letter indicates who has the authority to initiate a project, the second
letter who implements the project.
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Area Authority E[uP ]
I PP qA(B − cP )
II PP qP (β¯B − cP ) + (1− qP )qA(B − cP )
III AP qA(B − cP ) + (1− qA)qP (β¯B − cP )
IV AP qA(B − cP ) + (1− qA)qP (β¯B − cP )
V PP qA(B − cP )
V I PP qP (β¯B − cP ) + (1− qP )qA(B − cP )
V II AA qA(B − cP ) + (1− qA)qP (β¯B − cP )
V III AA qA(B − cP ) + (1− qA)qP (β¯B − cP )
IX AA qA(B − cP ) + (1− qA)qP (β¯B − cP )
X PA qAB − cP
XI PA qP (β¯B − cP ) + (1− qP )qA(B − cP )
+(1− qP )(1− qA)(−cP )
XII PA qP (β¯B − cP )
Table II.3: P’s expected utility for his preferred authority structure for
cases I-XII.
Which of these cases we have to compare depends on the position of
q˜P relative to cA/b. For all calculations concerning this comparison, see
Appendix A.
Situation 1: q˜P < cA/b
For qP < q˜P the principal prefers to leave both the authority to initiate
and the authority to implement to the agent. Between q˜P and cA/b, as
well as for qP > α¯, he rather keeps all authority to himself, whereas he
delegates merely the project choice to the agent when cA/b < qP < α¯.
Situation 2: cA/b < q˜P < α¯
In this case, the principal leaves all authority to the agent if qP < cA/b.
For cA/b < qP < α¯ he prefers the agent to pick a project, but he rather
keeps the authority to implement to himself, at least when q˜P < qP < α¯.
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(b) Situation 2: cA/b < q˜P < α¯
Figure II.9: Principal’s preferred authority structure.
Finally, as in the previous case, the principal prefers to keep all authority
to himself for qP > α¯
Note that the case α¯ < q˜P can never occur, since q˜P = (α¯b− cA)/(b−
cA) < α¯.
The results are summarized in Figure II.9. The letters describe the
principal’s preferred authority structure for each case, the first letter
indicating who has the authority to initiate a project, and the second
letter noting who has the authority to approve it.
In both situations 1 and 2, we find that for low values of qP AA-
authority performs best from the principal’s point of view. Since under
this regime the agent decides not only on the project choice, but also
on implementation, the discouraging effect of delegation which we found
before now completely disappears.
So, we can roughly summarize our results as follows: The higher qP ,
i.e., the higher the probability that the principal is of a high type, the
more likely he is to keep the final control over the project. For a very
high qP he gives no authority at all to the agent.
This is somewhat counterintuitive: the principal gives more authority
to the agent when he is actually less likely to be willing to compromise.
The more likely the principal is to agree with the agent’s choice, the more
he keeps the overall control.
The first effect is due to the fact that the agent needs the principal to
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get the project implemented even if the agent has the entire control.13 So,
for a very low qP , the agent will always choose the principal’s preferred
project and provide effort if possible. By consequence, the principal gets
his first best outcome: whenever a compromise between the two players
is possible it is going to be in his favor and his preferred project is going
to be realized.
However, as qP increases, so does the probability that the agent can
push through his own preferred project. To avoid this, the principal has
to keep authority at least over the implementation decision, or finally
even over the entire decision process and thus also the project choice.
II.6. Conclusion
Our analysis has shown that, in contrast to most of the existing litera-
ture on the topic, delegation may have a negative effect on the motivation
of agents whenever the agent cannot be sufficiently sure about the im-
plementation of a project. In that case, both parties are better off if
the principal chooses a project. On the other hand, delegation has a
motivating effect in the sense that if possible, the agent will choose the
principal’s preferred project and provide effort. When this effect domi-
nates, delegation thus improves coordination from the principal’s point
of view.
Furthermore we find an exploitation effect if the agent is “too sure”
about implementation. While this third effect can be avoided if the
principal keeps the authority to initiate the project, the discouraging
effect of delegation entirely disappears if the principal gives the agent
both the authority to initiate and to implement the project.
13This is again what we have called the positive or motivating effect of delegation
of authority before.
III. The Good, the Bad, and the Ordinary: Anti-Social
Behavior in Profit and Nonprofit Organizations
III.1. Introduction
In this paper, we analyze how different sources of intrinsic motivation of
workers may affect labor management and the production outcomes both
in for-profit and nonprofit organizations.
Most theoretical models on intrinsic motivation suppose that it arises
if workers derive a benefit from doing good - what is often referred to
as “warm glow” utility - or when workers are interested in a certain goal
or mission, like for example helping the poor or protecting the environ-
ment. An organization that is dedicated to such a mission may find it
easier and cheaper to attract workers pursuing similar goals. Intrinsic
motivation is hence treated by economists as something generally ben-
eficial to organizations. However, other aspects of a job may also instil
intrinsic motivation in certain types of workers. And these other aspects
are not necessarily beneficial for the employer. Take the following exam-
ple: helping refugees is the kind of mission-oriented work that is likely
to attract workers interested in this mission (what we will refer to as
“good” motivated workers). But such a job also involves working in a
remote location with little control from the outside. Circumstances such
as these may also attract workers with quite different intentions (what
we will call “bad”workers), as has been illustrated by the United Nations
sex-for-food scandal, which was exposed by “Save the Children”, a UK-
based nonprofit organization: it showed that in 2006 aid workers were
systematically abusing minors in a refugee camp in Liberia, selling food
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for sex with girls as young as 8.1
Unfortunately, more or less extreme examples for destructive or anti-
social behavior such as this abound: For instance, the Catholic Church is
quite obviously an organization that relies on the high intrinsic motiva-
tion of its workers, but, as illustrated by the recent scandals of abuse by
Catholic priests in the US, has been recurrently targeted by bad work-
ers.2 Similarly a pyromaniac may best be able to satisfy his urge for
fire, while minimizing his risk of being discovered, by working for the
firefighters, with the added advantage of being perceived as a hero.3 A
sadist might try to work in prisons or detention centers, preferably pro-
tected by national security secrecy or by their geographical remoteness,
to feed his need to humiliate and harm others.4 A pedophile, who de-
rives some intrinsic benefit from working in a job where he is in close
contact with children, will target vulnerable children, such as refugees or
orphans, simply because they are less likely to expose him. Other ex-
amples of anti-social behavior in non-profits are presented in Gibelman
and Gelman (2004) who summarize some recent scandals involving US
1See the report by Save the Children UK (2006). Similar cases have since been
reported from Southern Sudan, Burundi, Ivory Coast, East Timor, Congo, Cambodia,
Bosnia and Haiti (see “The U.N. sex-for-food scandal”, Washington Times, Tuesday,
May 9, 2006 and the report by Save the Children UK (2008)).
2The John Jay report (see Terry (2008)) indicated that some 11,000 allegations
of sexual abuse of children had been made against 4,392 priests in the USA. This
number constituted approximately 4% of the 110,000 priests who had served during
the 52-year period covered by the study (1950-2002). The report found that “the
problem was indeed widespread and affected more than 95 percent of the dioceses”.
3Stambaugh and Styron (2003) give an overview over the problem of
arson among firefighters and provide evidence, mostly from the United
States, showing that the problem is very serious. Similar cases have
been documented elsewhere, see for example http://www.lexpress.fr/
actualite/societe/pompier-pyromane-2-ans-de-prison_459032.html, or
http://www.swiss-firefighters.ch/News-file-article-sid-3427.html.
4As examples, see the Stanford experiment on prison (see http://www.prisonexp.
org/) and the torture Abu Ghraib scandal (see for instance http://www.time.com/
time/magazine/article/0,9171,1025139,00.html).
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and International non-government organizations (NGOs).5 Finally, anti-
social behaviors are not the monopoly of non-profit organizations. They
are also found in for-profits. For instance, a terrorist might want to work
in an airport to have a privileged access to planes. Or an industrial spy
would be interested in jobs in firms where he is likely to get access to a
lot of sensitive information, while his risk of being discovered is low.
We therefore face a situation where there are different sources of in-
trinsic motivation which may affect the production outcome both in the
mission- and the profit-oriented sector. To capture this problem, we as-
sume that there are three types of workers, who care for different things:
regular workers only care about monetary incentives, good workers care
about money and the mission of the organization, and bad workers care
about money and whether they can do things they like, but which are
harmful to the organization or society. We then consider two sectors of
the economy, one profit-oriented and one mission-oriented. As in Besley
and Ghatak (2005), on which our model is based, we assume that in the
nonprofit sector, organizations are structured around some mission, for
example providing public services, or catering to the needs of disadvan-
taged groups of society.6 These organizations may attract workers who
care about this specific mission and derive an intrinsic benefit from their
work. They can hence offer lower extrinsic incentives and still attract
motivated workers. We further generalize the approach by Besley and
Ghatak (2005) by introducing “bad” workers and adding monitoring as
an additional choice variable of the employer in order to deal with the
different incentive issues raised by the presence of different kinds of work-
ers: while monitoring reinforces the effort incentives of good and regular
5“Bad” actions by NGO employees mentioned in the paper by Gibelman and Gel-
man (2004) include questionable fund raising practices, mismanagement, embezzle-
ment, theft, money laundering, “personal lifestyle enhancement” and kickbacks, cor-
ruption, as well as sexual misconduct.
6We use the terms mission-oriented and nonprofit organization equivalently since
we believe them to be largely congruent in reality. However, there are cases where
organizations do not have the legal status of a nonprofit, but still follow a mission.
For a further discussion of this, see Besley and Ghatak (2005).
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workers, it makes “bad” actions or anti-social behavior less attractive as
it increases the chances of getting caught and being punished.
Given this setup, we first consider the case with only good and regular
workers and find the classic result that the mission-oriented sector offers
lower wages and makes less use of monitoring than the profit-oriented
sector. We then introduce bad workers who derive utility from behaving
in an anti-social way. It turns out that profit-oriented organizations are
a priori less vulnerable to such behavior. Bad workers may behave like
regular workers in the profit-oriented sector and thus be totally undis-
tinguishable from “normal” people. By contrast, if they join the mission-
oriented sector, then only in order to follow their destructive instincts.
The more organizations in this sector rely on the intrinsic motivation
of good workers and the less they make use of monetary incentives and
control, the more likely they are to become the target of bad workers.
We then analyze how contracts have to change in both sectors in order
to deter bad workers from their destructive behavior. However, deter-
rence is costly as it implies higher monitoring, and it even may become
entirely ineffective for workers with very high levels of bad motivation.
We therefore also consider ex ante measures of candidate selection, which
may help to reduce the occurrence of anti-social behavior.
Psychologists have long recognized and studied anti-social behavior.
One strand of the literature, as well as most traditional psychiatry, fo-
cuses on so-called internal determinants. Anti-social behaviors, perceived
as a pathology, are explained by individual predispositions such as ge-
netics, personality traits, or pathological risk factors rooted in childhood.
Another strand of the literature focuses on external determinants. It aims
to explain how “ordinary” people can be induced to behave in evil ways
by situational variables (see Zimbardo (2004)).7 Our paper is consistent
with both views. While it takes the level of bad motivation as exoge-
nous, it depends on the incentives given by an organization whether bad
7For instance, in a famous experiment on obedience to authority, Milgram (1974)
has shown that two thirds of the subjects were willing to inflict lethal electrical shocks
to total strangers.
35
workers will indeed act in an anti-social way or whether they will behave
just like regular workers.
By introducing bad workers, we contribute to the literature on in-
trinsic motivation and its effects on agents’ behavior which has received
increasing attention in recent years.8 In our analysis, intrinsic motivation
can be linked to a certain mission pursued by a particular organization.
Our model is hence related to models on public service motivation, as for
example in Francois (2000), Francois (2002), Prendergast (2007) and, in
particular, Delfgaauw and Dur (2008), to the extent that workers may
show some form of intrinsic motivation when working in a certain sector
or for a particular mission.9
Furthermore, our model is closely related to the paper by Besley and
Ghatak (2005) who show that matching the mission preferences of prin-
cipals and agents can enhance organizational efficiency and reduces the
need for high-powered incentives. There are hence many sectors where
wages are not paid conditional on performance, as for instance the civil
service sector or many nonprofit organizations.10 Nonprofits sometimes
are even legally forbidden to pay incentive wages; see, for instance, the
discussion in Glaeser (2002). Depending on the sector, this may have in-
stitutional reasons, as for example in the judicial sector, where economic
incentives are minimized in order to guarantee high quality independent
judgement (Posner, 1993). In other cases, especially in the case of devel-
opment aid, performance may just be too difficult to assess due to high
costs of monitoring in the field. This may lead to shirking and absen-
teeism as has been analyzed for example by Chaudhury, Hammer, Kre-
8See, for example, Be´nabou and Tirole (2003), Frey (1997), Murdock (2002) and
Akerlof and Kranton (2005). The effects of employees’ intrinsic motivation on firm
performance are discussed by Kreps (1997).
9Note, however, that from a technical point of view some of these models are quite
different from ours. In Francois (2000), for instance, all workers care for overall output
and have no particular preference for the public sector. Differences between the two
sectors only come into play through differences in property rights.
10See also Borzaga and Tortia (2006) and Ballou and Weisbrod (2003) for empirical
studies on the incentives in for-profit and different forms of nonprofit organizations.
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mer, Muralidharan, and Rogers (2006) and Banerjee and Duflo (2006).
However workers may not only just work less. They may also behave
in a way that damages the organization for which they work or which
is outright criminal. To prevent such destructive behaviors, nonprofits
therefore may want to engage in a more sophisticated selection process
of candidates. The difficulties of such a process have, for instance, been
discussed in Goldman (1982) and Greenberg and Haley (1986) for the
selection of judges.
The following section outlines the basic model with only good and
regular workers. We then introduce bad workers in Section III.3 and
show how the optimal contracts have to change. Section III.4 discusses
the ex ante selection of job candidates, and Section III.5 concludes.
III.2. Basic Setup
There are two sectors i = F,N , where F stands for for-profit or profit-
oriented and N for nonprofit or mission-oriented. Furthermore, there are
three types of agents j = g, r, b, where g stands for good, r for regular
and b for bad workers, with shares xg + xr + xb = 1 in the population.
As a benchmark case, we first concentrate on good and regular workers
only. In contrast to regular agents, good agents derive an intrinsic benefit
θg > 0 from working in the nonprofit sector N . In sector F , neither type
of agent r or g derives a positive intrinsic benefit.
Each agent produces a basic output q and, depending on his effort
e, an additional output ∆q with probability e. His effort cost is c(e) =
a ·e2/2. In order to induce agent j to work harder, the principal in sector
i can offer him a contract consisting of a basic wage wij plus a bonus
payment tij ≥ 0 if a high output is observed. However, the principal
only observes the agent’s output with probability mi, where mi is the
monitoring level in sector i. The cost of monitoring isM(mi). We assume
that mi ∈ {0, [m, 1]}, i.e., the principal can choose not to monitor or else
he has to choose at least a minimum level of monitoring m > 0. As will
become clear later on, in most cases the principal will want to set the
monitoring level as low as possible. This result is similar to Becker (1968).
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For the sake of clarity we therefore introduce a minimum monitoring level
m. The idea is that there is some fixed cost to monitoring. For example,
the principal may have to hire at least one employee for the task.
We assume that there is a limited liability constraint such that the
agent has to receive at least a monetary payoff of w ≥ 0. Furthermore, the
agent’s outside utility is assumed to be u¯j ≥ 0. Given these constraints,
the principals in both sectors try to maximize their profits over wij, tij
and mi as follows:
piij = q + (∆q −mitij)eij − wij −M(mi) , (III.1)
subject to the following constraints
(LL) wij ≥ w , (III.2)
(PC) uij = wij + (mitij + θij)eij − ae
2
ij/2 ≥ u¯j , (III.3)
(IC) eij = arg max
e∈[0,1]
{





It follows immediately from the incentive constraint (III.4) that the
agent will choose his optimal effort level as eij = (mitij + θij)/a. We
assume that a is sufficiently large to make sure that we get an interior
solution eij ≤ 1:
Assumption 2: a ≥ ∆q +max{θg, θb}.
Under Assumption 2, we can rewrite the maximization problem as
max
wij ,tij ,mi
piij = q + (∆q −mitij)
mitij + θij
a
− wij −M(mi) ,
subject to
(LL) wij ≥ w ,
(PC) uij = (mitij + θij)
2/(2a) + wij ≥ u¯j .
We aim to study cases where in the absence of intrinsic motivation,
inducing effort has some value to the principal. This requires that the




M(m). Moreover, we concentrate on outcomes with non-negative payoffs
for the principal which is assured by q − w −M(m) > 0. The following
assumption assures that the solutions derived in the paper are hence
optimal:
Assumption 3: ∆q2 ≥ 4aM(m) and q > w +M(m).
Let us define vij as the reservation payoff level such that for u¯j ≥ vij
the participation constraint of agent j becomes binding and v˜ij as the
level of outside utility where the agent’s limited liability constraint ceases
to be binding. Furthermore, let v¯ij be defined as the level of reservation

















2 + q −M(m) .
It is straightforward to check that under Assumption 2: vij ≤ v˜ij ≤ v¯ij .
Then the following proposition characterizes the optimal contract:
Proposition 1: : Suppose Assumptions 1 and 2 hold. An optimal




ij) between a principal in sector i and an agent of
type j given a reservation payoff u¯j ∈ [0, v¯ij ] exists and has the following
features:
(a) The optimal fixed wage is
w∗ij =
{





2 if u¯j ∈ [v˜ij, v¯ij ]
,
(b) The monitoring level is set at the minimum level whenever extrinsic
incentives are necessary, i.e., m∗i = m when tij > 0, and is zero
otherwise.
11For more details on this, see the proof of Proposition 1 in Appendix B.
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max{0, (∆q − θij)/(2m)} if u¯j ∈ [0, vij ]
(
√
2a(u¯j − w)− θij)/m if u¯j ∈ [vij, v˜ij]
∆q/m if u¯j ∈ [v˜ij, v¯ij ]
.
All proofs can be found in Appendix B.
We can thus discern three cases:
• Case I: The limited liability constraint is binding, but not the par-
ticipation constraint of the agent. This corresponds to a case where
w is relatively high compared to u¯j. In other words, this holds for
low values of the reservation utility: u¯j ∈ [0, vij ]. The optimal
contract in this case is described by w∗ij = w, t
∗
ij = max{0, (∆q −
θij)/(2m)}, and m
∗
i = m if t
∗
ij > 0 and zero otherwise.
• Case II: Both the limited liability and the participation constraint
are binding . This holds for intermediary values of the reservation
utility: u¯j ∈ [vij , v˜ij]. The optimal contract in this case is described






2a(u¯j − w)− θij , and m
∗






• Case III: The participation constraint is binding, but not the lim-
ited liability constraint. This corresponds to a case where u¯j is
relatively high, i.e., for u¯j ∈ [v˜ij , v¯ij ]. The optimal contract in this
case is described by w∗ij = u¯j − (∆q + θij)
2/(2a), m∗i = m and
t∗ij = ∆q/m.
Which case is relevant for the principal depends on the agent’s outside
option u¯j and his level of intrinsic motivation θij . Figure III.1 gives an
overview.
The first two cases are the cases described in Besley and Ghatak
(2005). The reason why the third case is not relevant in Besley and
Ghatak’s (2005) model is that they do not have a basic payoff q which
accrues to the principal even if the agent makes no special effort. As a
consequence, whenever the incentive scheme is not profitable because the





















Figure III.1: Optimal contract depending on u¯ and θij .
by contrast, the principal can fulfill the agent’s participation condition
even for higher outside options (i.e., u¯j > w + ∆q
2/2a, that is the area
above the horizontal dotted line in Figure III.1) because the resulting
costs are still covered by the basic production payoff q.
In the following, we will discuss in more detail how Proposition 1
translates into an optimal contract in each of the two sectors N and F .
III.2.1. For-Profit Sector
Let us first consider the implications of Proposition 1 for the profit-
oriented sector. The principal in the profit-oriented sector cannot rely
on worker’s intrinsic motivation (i.e., θFj = 0) and hence always has to
provide sufficient extrinsic incentives. In particular, he always has to
invest in monitoring. As a corollary from Proposition 1 we then get the
following:
Corollary 1: : Depending on the size of the agent’s reservation util-
ity, we can discern the following cases:
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• Case I: For u¯ ∈ [0, vF ], the optimal contract in F is given by
w∗F = w , m
∗
F = m , t
∗
F = ∆q/(2m) ;
• Case II: For u¯ ∈ [vF , v˜F ], the optimal contract in F is given by
w∗F = w , m
∗





• Case III: For u¯ ∈ [v˜F , v¯F ], the optimal contract in F is given by
w∗F = u¯−∆q
2/(2a) , m∗F = m , t
∗
F = ∆q/m ;
where
vF = ∆q
2/(8a) + w ,
v˜F = ∆q
2/(2a) + w ,
v¯F = ∆q
2/(2a) + q −M(m) .
As a consequence, the utility of a worker, no matter whether good or
regular, in sector F in case I hence is uF = w + ∆q
2/(8a). In cases II
and III it is equal to u¯.
The principal’s payoff is












(2a(u¯− w)− w in case II
1
2a
∆q2 − u¯ in case III
.
III.2.2. Non-Profit Sector
In contrast to the profit-oriented sector, the mission-oriented sector N
can save on wage costs by exploiting the intrinsic motivation of “good”
workers. By offering a lower basic wage and/or lower effort incentives,
N can still attract good workers (i.e., with θgN ≥ 0) whereas regular
workers will prefer their outside option or work in F .
Suppose the level of intrinsic motivation of good workers is θNg ≡ θg.
Then we get the following corollary from Proposition 1 for the non-profit
sector:
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Corollary 2: : Depending on the size of the agent’s outside option,
the optimal contract between a “good” agent and the principal in sector
N is characterized as follows:
• Case I: For u¯ ∈ [0, vN ], we get two subcases:
(a) If θg is low, i.e., if θg < ∆q (case Ia in Fig. III.1), then the
optimal contract is given by
w∗N = w , m
∗
N = m , t
∗
N = (∆q − θg)/(2m)
(b) If θg is high, i.e., if θg > ∆q (case Ib in Fig. III.1), then
w∗N = w , m
∗
N = 0 , t
∗
N = 0
• Case II: If u¯ ∈ [vN , v˜N ], then the optimal contract is given by








m∗N = m , if t
∗
N > 0 and m
∗
N = 0 otherwise .
• Case III: If u¯ ∈ [v˜N , v¯N ], then the optimal contract is given by
w∗N = u¯− (∆q + θg)
2/(2a) , m∗N = m , t
∗


















2 + q −M(m) .
The utility of a motivated agent in cases II and III corresponds to his
reservation utility u¯, whereas in case I he gets




θ2g if ∆q < θg
(∆q + θg)
2/4 if ∆q ≥ θg
,
which is higher or equal to what he would get in sector F . “Good”
agents with low reservation utility hence prefer the contract proposed in
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Corollary 2 to the contract offered in sector F . Low reservation utility
typically corresponds to junior workers with no or little experience and
thus relatively low outside opportunity. We thus expect young idealistic
people to join the nonprofit sector. Empirically they should be over-
represented compared to other workers.
Regular agents, on the other hand, do not derive any intrinsic satis-
faction from working in the mission-oriented sector, but only care about
monetary incentives. It turns out that for any given level of reservation










F . As a consequence, the utility
of a regular worker under the above contract is always smaller than the
utility level he can reach under the contract proposed in sector F .
As a result, regular workers will choose to work in sector F and“good”
motivated workers will prefer to work in sector N .
The principal’s profit in case I hence is




 ∆qθg if ∆q < θg(∆q+θg
2
)2
−M(m) if ∆q ≥ θg
.
In case II, it is
piN = q +
1
a




(2a(u¯− w)− w −M(m) ,
and in case III









By exploiting the intrinsic motivation of “good”workers, the principal
in N can hence save on wage and monitoring costs relative to sector F
by offering lower incentives and making less use of monitoring.12 Indeed,
comparing piN with piF in each case, it is straightforward to see that
12A nonprofit does not make any profits by definition. So while we sometimes refer
to piN and piF as profit, it rather measures the relation between personnel costs and
production. If the nonprofit has to spend less on its workers, this eases its budget
constraint and makes more funds available for other things. This becomes particularly
relevant if we take into account that many nonprofits are financed by donations and
may have to run their operations on a rather tight budget.
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piN > piF if θg > 0. Moreover, in contrast to sector F , principals in sector
N may not need to monitor their workers at all: If θg > ∆q, workers are
motivated enough to provide effort even if there is no extrinsic incentive
and no monitoring.
III.3. Bad Motivation
So far we have considered the case where intrinsic motivation is neces-
sarily good for the firm. However, this may not always be true. Workers
may pursue their own private benefit to the detriment of the organization
they work for. We model this by allowing workers to choose a “destruc-
tive effort” d ∈ [0, 1] rather than the “normal” effort e considered so far.
There are some workers who get a private benefit θb from choosing such a
negative effort, and by doing so they may cause a damage D to the firm
they are working for. We denote the probability that a job candidate in
sector i = F,N is a “bad” type as βi.
Consider the following utility function for bad workers in sector i =
F,N :
uib = wi +
{
mitie− ae
2/2 if e ≥ 0
(θb −miK)d− ad
2/2 if d ≥ 0
,
where K is an exogenous punishment that can be imposed on a worker
if a negative effort is observed. The idea behind this is that a negative
effort corresponds not just to shirking but is an outright act of sabotage
which can be treated as a criminal offense and hence can be punished by
a fine or a prison term. However, as this is beyond the influence of the
firm, we treat the punishment as exogenous.
Note that the worker chooses either one of the two options, i.e., he
either decides to satisfy his destructive impulse and get intrinsic satisfac-
tion from doing so (d ≥ 0). Or he behaves like a regular worker, chooses
e ≥ 0 and aims at getting monetary rewards.
As can be seen from this utility function, bad guys may be willing to
make a “good” effort if given the right incentives.
Taking into account the worker’s optimal effort choice, which under
Assumption 1 is still lower than 1 (i.e., there is an interior solution), we
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can rewrite his expected utility as
uib = wi +
{
(miti)
2/(2a) if e ≥ 0
(θb −miK)
2/(2a) if d ≥ 0
.
Bad types therefore prefer to exert a positive effort rather than to follow
their destructive impulse and sabotage if
miti ≥ θb −miK . (III.5)
In the following, we first analyze how a bad worker’s choice between
sector N and F is determined before we look at the implications of this
choice for the optimal contracts in each sector.
III.3.1. Automatic Deterrence of Bad Workers
In this section, we analyze the behavior of bad workers for a given set of
contracts, namely the optimal contracts derived in the previous section.
This also allows us to determine under what circumstances organizations
in sectors N and F have to adapt their incentive schemes to the presence
of bad workers and when there is “automatic” deterrence of anti-social
behavior, i.e., without any change in the optimal contracts.
Suppose, for the moment, that the contracts in both sectors stay as
calculated in Section 2, i.e., that they are not adapted to the presence of
“bad”workers. How will bad workers behave under these circumstances?
When will they opt for sector N , when for sector F ?
To answer these questions, we need to compare a bad worker’s payoff
from choosing effort e or d in both sectors given the optimal contracts de-
rived in Section III.2. This comparison shows that for a given reservation
utility u¯ the incentive for choosing a positive effort e are always higher
in F than in N , i.e., uFb(e) > uNb(e). At the same time, the monitoring
level in N is always smaller or equal than that in sector F , thus making
it less likely to get caught with bad actions in the nonprofit sector and
therefore uNb(d) ≥ uFb(d). From this follows:
Corollary 3: : Under the optimal contracts as proposed in Proposi-
tion 1, “bad” workers never join the mission-oriented sector to do good,












Figure III.2: Automatic Deterrence in Sector F .
That is, bad workers will only join N to follow their destructive im-
pulse, while minimizing the risk of being detected and punished.
Next, let us look in more detail at what happens in each sector. It is
clear from (III.5) that for low levels of negative motivation θb, bad workers
are better off if they choose a positive rather than a destructive effort.
In sector F , such “automatic” deterrence of bad workers, i.e., deterrence
without any change of the optimal contract as derived in Corollary 1,




∆q/2 +mK if u¯ ∈ [0, vF ]√
2a(u¯− w) +mK if u¯ ∈ [vF , v˜F ]
∆q +mK if u¯ ∈ [v˜F , v¯F ]
, (III.6)
where vF , v˜F , v¯F are defined as in Corollary 1. If the above holds true,
then a bad worker’s payoff from choosing a “normal” effort e is anyway
higher than his payoff from choosing a destructive effort d in F . As shown
in Figure III.2, bad workers with θb < θ˜b are therefore “automatically”
deterred from anti-social behavior.
Next, let us consider what happens in the nonprofit sector N . Bad
workers will be discouraged from joining this sector as long as uNb(d) ≤
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uFb(e).
13 Automatic deterrence, i.e. deterrence of bad workers with-























N) + (mF tF )
2 +m∗NK . (III.8)
In order to determine the exact level of
˜˜
θb, we then have to insert
the optimal contracts in N and F into equation (III.8). For the sake
of shortness, we will skip this exercise here. The interested reader may
however find the detailed calculations in Appendix B. The results are also
shown in Figure III.3 which depicts the level of automatic deterrence in
the nonprofit sector,
˜˜
θb, as a black curve. For (u¯, θb)-combinations below
this curve, bad workers prefer to work either in sector F or enjoy their
outside utility u¯. Furthermore, the level of automatic deterrence in sector
F , θ˜b, is also featured in Figure III.3 and is depicted as a dashed gray
line. This allows us to see immediately that, depending on the exact
values of θg, θb and u¯, sector N is either better or worse protected from
destructive behavior than sector F :
• For u¯ > v¯F , i.e., for very high levels of reservation utility, F can no
longer offer contracts that would satisfy the worker’s participation
constraint and at the same time yield a positive payoff to the firm.
Therefore, nonprofit organizations are the only possible employer
for agents with such a high reservation utility. But even working
in N is relatively unattractive due to rather low basic wages. Bad
workers will therefore prefer to enjoy their outside utility u¯ and
only the most motivated will find it worthwhile to work at all. As a
result, the level of deterrence in sector N for u¯ > v¯F is rather high,
as can be seen both from III.3(a) and III.3(b).
• A more relevant scenario is one where u¯ ≤ v¯F , i.e. the outside
utility of the agents is such that both types of organizations may

























(b) θg > ∆q
Figure III.3: Automatic Deterrence in N . For (u¯, θb)-combinations in the
shaded area, bad workers are automatically deterred from bad actions in
sector N .
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attract workers. Let us first consider what happens if θg < ∆q as
shown in Figure III.3(a). For such low levels of intrinsic motivation
of good workers, the level of automatic deterrence is the same in
sector N and F because the monitoring level is the same in both
sectors. Only for v˜F < u¯ ≤ v¯F , automatic deterrence is slightly
higher in N since the basic wage in N is lower than in F and hence
makes working in N less attractive.
• The most interesting case arises for low levels of reservation utility
u¯ and high intrinsic motivation of good workers (θg > ∆q) as shown
in Figure III.3(b). In that case, the nonprofit firm relies entirely
on the intrinsic motivation of good workers and hence provides no
extrinsic incentives, i.e., mN = 0 (Case Ib). The nonprofit firm
then becomes particularly attractive for “bad” types. They can get
uNb(d) = w + θ
2
b/(2a) ,
from choosing a negative effort in sector N , whereas they would get
utility
uFb(e) = w +∆q
2/(8a) ,
from choosing a positive effort in sector F . Therefore, all bad work-
ers with θb > ∆q/2 will opt for sector N and provide a destructive
effort. Bad workers with a lower θb will choose sector F and behave
like regular workers.
The analysis in this section thus has provided us with several insights:
First, we have seen that bad workers only join sector N in order to behave
in a destructive way, whereas they may behave like regular workers in
sector F . And second, we have seen that while the low basic wages in N
may act as a deterrent for high levels of reservation utility, the nonprofit
sector becomes very vulnerable to anti-social behavior if it relies heavily
on the intrinsic motivation of its workers and hence does not monitor
enough.
In the following, we analyze how the optimal contracts in both sectors
have to change in order to account for the presence of bad motivated
workers if there is no “automatic” deterrence.
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III.3.2. “Bad” Workers in the Profit-Oriented Sector
As we have seen in the previous section, it is not necessary to adjust
the optimal contracts described in Proposition 1 as long as the intrinsic
motivation of bad workers θb is sufficiently low. This is the case if θb is
below θ˜b as defined in (III.6). So, next we consider what happens if θb is
higher than θ˜b and how the optimal contracts then should be adjusted.
To do so, we assume that organizations in the profit-oriented sector do
not take into account the policy of the mission-oriented sector, whereas
the latter takes policies in the former sector as given. This is equivalent
to assuming that sector N is small compared to sector F , i.e., the share
of good workers in the population, xg, is small relative to the share of
regular workers, xr.
Full Deterrence
If the principal wants to deter bad workers all together from being de-
structive, his maximization problem becomes14
max
wF ,tF ,mF
piF = q + (∆q −mF tF )mF tF
1
a
− wF −M(mF ) ,
subject to
(LL) wF ≥ w ,
(PC) (mF tF )
2/(2a) + wF ≥ u¯j ,
(DET ) mF tF ≥ θb −mFK ,
where the last constraint is new. This deterrence constraint ensures that
bad workers prefer to make a positive rather than a destructive effort.
For θb > θ˜b the deterrence constraint becomes binding and we can hence
rewrite the principal’s maximization problem as
max
wF ,mF
piF = q + (∆q − θb +mFK)(θb −mFK)
1
a
− wF −M(mF ) ,
subject to
(LL) wF ≥ w , (III.9)
(PC) (θb −mFK)
2/(2a) + wF ≥ u¯j . (III.10)
14The agent’s incentive constraint is already taken into account here.
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As before, the solution of this maximization problem gives rise to three
different cases, depending on the reservation utility of the workers. We
define vFb as the outside utility for which the modified participation con-
straint as given in (III.10) becomes binding. Furthermore, let us define
v˜Fb as the level of outside utility at which the limited liability constraint
ceases to be binding and v¯Fb as the highest level of outside utility at
which the for-profit firm still makes a nonnegative profit. Additionally,
we have to define an upper bound for the level of negative intrinsic mo-
tivation θ¯b: for θb > θ¯b, the monitoring level is equal to one and cannot
increase further.
The optimal contract with full deterrence in sector F then is described
by the following proposition:
Proposition 2: : For θ˜b < θb < θ¯b, the optimal contract with full




F ) in sector F given a reservation payoff u¯ ∈
[0, v¯Fb] has the following features:
(a) The optimal fixed wage is
wdetF =
{






2 if u¯ ∈ [v˜Fb, v¯Fb]
,
(b) The optimal monitoring level mdetF is such that the following condi-
tions hold:
2mdetF K +M






2a(u¯− w)) if u¯ ∈ [vFb, v˜Fb] ,
mdetF K +M
′(mdetF )a/K = θb −∆q if u¯ ∈ [v˜Fb, v¯Fb] .





Note that although we still may get three cases, depending on the
outside utility of the agents, the borders between these three cases have
shifted relative to those in Corollary 1. In particular, vFb > vF , and
52
v˜Fb > v˜F , but v¯Fb < v¯F . For a more detailed discussion, see the proof of
Proposition 2 in Appendix B.
Furthermore, Proposition 2 implies that, in order to fully deter bad
workers from bad actions, the principal in sector F has to raise his mon-
itoring level relative to the benchmark case without destructive motiva-
tion, no matter what the outside utility of the agent, i.e. mdetF > m
∗
F .







F . As a consequence, besides deterring bad workers from
bad actions, this contract will also induce regular workers to choose a
higher effort level.
No Full Deterrence
Alternatively, the principal may accept the possibility that destructive
behavior may occur. Let βF be the share of bad workers in sector F in
this case.15 Taking into account the agent’s optimal effort choice, the
principal’s maximization problem then corresponds to
max
wF ,tF ,mF






+q − wF −M(mF ) ,
subject to the worker’s limited liability and participation constraint as
stated in (III.2) and (III.3).
The optimal contract then takes the following form:







sector F given a reservation payoff u¯ ∈ [0, v¯F ] has the following features:
(a) The optimal fixed wage is
wndF =
{
w if u¯ ∈ [0, v˜F ]
u¯− 1
2a
∆q2 if u¯ ∈ [v˜F , v¯F ]
,
(b) The monitoring level mndF is such that M
′(mndF ) = βFDK/a.
15Note that βF is actually endogenous. It is defined as the share of bad workers in
sector F . If, for example, all regular and all bad workers opt for sector F , then the
share of bad workers in this sector is βF = xb/(xr + xb).
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Note that the incentives to provide effort e are still the same as with-






F in each of the three cases. However,
the transfer level tndF is lower than without bad workers, whereas the mon-
itoring level mndF has increased. While the principal may not be able to
prevent bad behavior, the expected reward for such behavior thus is lower
and hence the level of destructive effort chosen by the workers is lower.
Therefore, the expected damage from bad behavior goes down.
Whether the principal in sector F prefers full deterrence or whether
he opts for no full deterrence depends on his respective expected profit.
Under the former regime, his expected profit is












whereas in the latter case his profit becomes














+q − wndF −M(m
nd
F ) .
As can be seen easily from the second function, the expected profit with-
out full deterrence is strictly decreasing in the share of bad workers in
sector F , βF , in the damage these workers may cause D and in their in-
trinsic motivation θb. This means that the larger the share of bad workers
in sector F and the higher the expected damage, the more likely it is that
pidetF > pi
nd
F , i.e., that the principal in sector F will prefer to fully deter
bad workers. If, for instance, the number of regular workers in the popu-
lation xr is very high, this implies that the relative share of bad workers
in sector F , βF , is low and full deterrence hence is less attractive. Fur-
thermore, the monitoring technology plays a role. If the marginal cost of
an increased level of monitoring is high, then full deterrence may be too
costly.
III.3.3. “Bad” Workers in the Mission-Oriented Sector
For low levels of “bad” motivation θb, the non-profit sector is protected
from destructive behavior by the higher effort incentives offered in the
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profit-oriented sector, i.e., bad workers’ utility from choosing a normal
effort e in sector F is higher than their utility from choosing a destructive










The principal in the mission-oriented sector therefore does not need to









2a(wF − w∗N) + (mF tF )
2 +m∗NK ,
given a contract (wF , mF , tF ) in sector F .
If the level of motivation of bad workers is higher, i.e., if θb >
˜˜
θb, then
the principal in sectorN will have to increase his monitoring level to deter
bad workers from choosing a destructive effort. However, the principal
cannot increase his monitoring level beyond mN = 1. To account for this
fact and make sure that mN ≤ 1, the following assumption is sufficient:
Assumption 4: θb ≤ K +∆q/2 .
The effort incentives for good workers, however, need not be affected
by this change in the intensity of monitoring: in order to induce good
workers to provide effort, nothing more than the optimal incentives as
described in Corollary 2 are needed.
Therefore the following proposition holds:
Proposition 4: : For
˜˜
θb < θb ≤ K + ∆q/2, and given a contract
(mF , tF , wF ) in sector F and a reservation payoff u¯ ∈ [0, v¯F ], the principal
in sector N can achieve full deterrence of “bad” workers by offering a




N ) with the following features:




N as defined in Corollary 2.
(b) The monitoring level is
mdetN = (θb −
√
2a(wF − wN) + (mF tF )2)/K.










N as defined in
Corollary 2.
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Suppose there is full deterrence in sector F . For u¯ ∈ [0, v˜F ], i.e., if
the basic wage is the same in both sectors, N can achieve full deterrence
of bad workers by choosing the same monitoring level in N as in F . If
u¯ > v˜F , then the basic wage in F is higher than in N , hence making
work in N less attractive for bad workers. This gives some additional
protection to sectorN and hence allows principals in this sector to achieve
full deterrence of bad workers with a monitoring level slightly lower than
the one used in sector F , albeit still higher than the optimal monitoring
level without bad workers.
With bad workers, the mission-oriented sector hence looses much of
its wage cost advantage compared to the for-profit sector. The loss is
particularly high when θg > ∆q: in this case (case Ib in the above), the
presence of bad workers means that firms have to go from no monitoring
at all to whatever monitoring there is in the for-profit sector. That is,
by raising the level of monitoring, destructive behavior in N becomes
sufficiently unattractive and bad workers prefer to behave like regular
workers in sector F . However, there is no need for sector N to adapt
its incentives otherwise, i.e., the optimal basic wage stays the same as
before, and overall incentives will still be equal to m∗N t
∗
N . Even with full
deterrence of bad workers, the profit in sector N therefore is still higher
than in sector F .
The expected profit in N under full deterrence in both sectors is











N ) . (III.11)
Under which circumstances will there be no full deterrence in sector










+q − wN −M(mN ) ,
subject to the limited liability and participation constraints of the work-
ers as given by (III.2) and (III.3). Similar as in sector F , his optimal
monitoring level then is mndN = βNDK/a, while the basic wage and the
56












The expected profit in N without full deterrence therefore is





















Comparing (III.12) and (III.11), we find that no full deterrence is the













2 < M(mdetN )−M(m
nd
N ) .
i.e., if the share of bad workers in sector N , βN , is lower and if additional
monitoring is very costly.
Proposition 5: : If there is full deterrence in F , then full deterrence
in N is optimal.
The reasons for this statement are straightforward: We know that F
will only prefer full deterrence if the expected damage from bad workers
is large enough, i.e., in particular if βF , the share of bad workers in F
without full deterrence, is high.
Note that βF is equal to the number of bad workers over all workers in
sector F , i.e., it is equal to xb/(xb+xr) if all bad workers (share xb in the
overall population) and all regular (share xr in the overall population)
workers work in F . Similarly, βN = xb/(xg+xb) if all bad workers choose
to work in N , which also attracts all good workers (share xg in the overall
population).16
Since we assumed that xr > xg, xb/(xb+xr) < xb/(xb+xg). Hence if
full deterrence is optimal in F , then it must also be optimal in N since
the otherwise expected damage in N is even higher than in F . Also, as
we have seen above, the costs of full deterrence in N are lower than those
in F .
If there is no full deterrence in F , whether N opts for full deterrence
or not depends on the share of bad workers in the overall population,
16If all bad workers prefer sector N over F , then βN = 0.
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xb, and the cost of increased monitoring. When the expected damage
from bad workers is sufficiently low or if a high level of monitoring is too
costly, there will be no full deterrence in N . However, N is more affected
by the presence of bad workers since xg < xr and hence may opt for full
deterrence even if there is no full deterrence in F .
III.4. Ex Ante Control
The last section has shown that depending on the level of negative moti-
vation of bad workers, θb, firms may be able to deal with the problem by
adapting their incentive schemes and in particular their monitoring lev-
els. However, this increase of ex post monitoring may be very costly, and
for high levels of negative motivation it becomes even entirely ineffective.
Firms therefore may want to invest in ex ante measures to reduce the
probability of hiring a bad worker in the first place.
Some form of applicant screening, which may serve to filter out more
trustworthy or motivated workers, is quite common in most firms. The
higher the expected damage of hiring a bad worker, the more an organi-
zation or firm will be inclined to invest in a more sophisticated selection
process of applicants. This is commonly observed especially in sectors
where candidates, once hired, are difficult to fire, as for example civil ser-
vants,17 or where the stakes are high, e.g., in intelligence services. The
selection process in these cases can be quite lengthy and generally involves
all kinds of tests and background checks. For instance, the CIA states
on its web site:18 “Depending on an applicant’s specific circumstances,
the [application] process may take as little as two months or more than
a year. [. . . ] Applicants must undergo a thorough background investi-
gation examining their life history, character, trustworthiness, reliability
and soundness of judgment [. . . ], [their] freedom from conflicting alle-
giances, potential to be coerced and willingness and ability to abide by
regulations governing the use, handling and the protection of sensitive
17Goldman (1982) and Greenberg and Haley (1986) discuss this issue for the case
of judges in the United States.
18See https://www.cia.gov/careers/faq/index.html#a3
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information. The Agency uses the polygraph to check the veracity of
this information. The hiring process also entails a thorough medical ex-
amination of one’s mental and physical fitness to perform essential job
functions.” The FBI states that “The clearance process can take any-
where from several months to a year or more”,19 and lists as part of
the background check “a polygraph examination; a test for illegal drugs;
credit and records checks; and extensive interviews with former and cur-
rent colleagues, neighbors, friends, professors, etc.”
Similarly, many nonprofit organizations require a lot of previous ex-
perience and conduct extensive interviews before hiring someone, espe-
cially in cases where monitoring in the field is difficult (e.g., Me´decins
sans Frontie`res).
A better candidate selection process can thus serve as a (partial)
substitute for worker monitoring.20 However, checking each applicant is
costly, and therefore has to be seen in relation to the potential damage
of hiring a bad worker.
In this context, legal requirements may play an important role in order
to help employers screen out bad workers. In Germany, for instance, em-
ployers can ask applicants for their official police record (“Fu¨hrungszeug-
nis”), which, however, only documents offenses that are punishable be-
yond a certain degree of penalty in order to give offenders a second
chance. Unfortunately, until recently, many potentially relevant cases
of molestation, child pornography, exhibitionism etc. did thus not ap-
pear in the records. This came under discussion with the occurrence of
several cases of child molestation where the employer was unaware of his
employee’s history, although the employee had been convicted for similar
behavior before. To prevent cases like this in the future, the government
introduced an “extended police record” (“erweitertes Fu¨hrungszeugnis”),
which can be requested for anyone seeking employment in a job that may
19See http://www.fbijobs.gov/61.asp#3
20See Huang (2007) and Huang and Cappelli (2006) for a discussion on the possible
tradeoff between worker monitoring and ex ante applicant screening.
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bring him or her in contact with children or youths.21
In other cases, establishing a clearer profile of bad workers may help.
This has, for example, been done in the US to prevent fire fighter ar-
son. Studies by the South Carolina Forestry Commission and the FBI22
have found that arsonists are typically white males between 17 and 26
years of age, with a difficult family background, lacking social and in-
terpersonal skills, often of average intelligence but with poor academic
performance. Also, arson seems to be more likely with volunteer fire
fighters than with professionals who, in the U.S. as well as in many Eu-
ropean countries make up for at least 75% of all fire fighters. The South
Carolina Forestry Commission hence has designed an “Arson Screening
and Prediction System” which is supposed to help field level administra-
tors to evaluate candidates. It attributes a numeric score to the answers
to a questionnaire covering areas such as the candidate’s family back-
ground, his social skills, capacity for self control, intelligence, self-esteem
and academic performance, stress and attitudes towards the fire service.
Yet another measure to prevent destructive behavior may be to pro-
mote peer monitoring, which is especially attractive if ex ante candidate
screening is less than perfect and monitoring of workers is difficult.23 In
the case of fire fighter arson, for example, promoting peer monitoring
consists of awareness programs that are supposed to alert fire depart-
ments to the problem and keep their eyes open. In other cases, peer
monitoring can be induced through simple institutional features, such as
letting employees work pairwise, as it is common for police officers, hiring
21See press release of the German Ministry of Justice from 14 May
2009, http://www.bmj.bund.de/enid/Nationales_Strafrecht/Erweitertes_
Fuehrungszeugnis_1js.html .
22See Stambaugh and Styron (2003) for a summary of both studies.
23There are relatively few theoretical papers on peer monitoring, exceptions being
Barron and Gjerde (1997) and Kandel and Lazear (1992), who both analyze the
interaction between peer pressure and the provision of incentives in teams.
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couples,24 or providing joint housing for aid workers.25 While this may
give rise to collusion among evil-doers, such a scheme is likely to work
reasonably well if there are enough “good” motivated workers who care
about the mission of the organization they work for.
III.5. Conclusion
We have shown how the existence of “destructive” workers who derive
satisfaction from actions that are detrimental to their employer or others
may affect the optimal wage contracts offered. In particular, we discussed
how this may affect nonprofit organizations that rely at least to some
extent on the intrinsic motivation of their workers but may be unable to
filter out workers with a “negative” motivation.
First of all, we showed that without bad workers, the mission-oriented
sector N can save on wage and monitoring costs compared to the profit-
oriented sector F . If the intrinsic motivation of good workers is high
enough, it may even forego bonus payments and monitoring altogether.
However, the lack of monitoring and extrinsic incentives makes N par-
ticularly vulnerable to destructive behavior by bad workers: we showed
that if bad workers join sector N then only to follow their destructive
instincts and not because they want to provide a positive effort.
In order to reduce the negative impact of bad workers, both the profit-
and the mission-oriented sector have to increase their monitoring levels.
We showed that to achieve full deterrence of bad workers, the profit-
oriented sector may even have to increase effort incentives beyond the
optimal level as described in Section III.2, i.e., not only monitoring has
24There is anecdotal evidence that, for example, the French service for teaching
abroad prefers to hire couples, not only for monitoring reasons, but mainly because
they have been found to withstand stress caused by a new environment better.
25This is for example the approach of A¨rzte fu¨r die Dritte Welt (Doctors for De-
veloping Countries), a German NGO that runs several permanent projects in Africa,
Asia and Central America with the help of doctors doing short term volunteer work.
Again, this rather has practical reasons and is not necessarily intended as a measure
to promote peer monitoring, but still it may act in such a way.
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to be increased, but also the expected return for effort mF tF is higher.
By contrast, the mission-oriented sector can achieve full deterrence by
choosing the same monitoring level as in sector F , but otherwise keeping
extrinsic incentives at the same level as before. That is, to the same
extent that the monitoring level mN increases, the bonus payment tN
decreases such that the overall effort incentives are still at their optimal
level m∗N t
∗
N . The mission-oriented sector therefore still may enjoy a cer-
tain cost advantage, since it is cheaper to get already motivated workers
to provide effort.
However, increased monitoring of workers may be difficult and expen-
sive under many circumstances, thus requiring firms to make a better ex
ante candidate selection.
In order to focus on the incentive problems raised by the presence of
“bad” workers, we have not taken into account other differences between
profit- and mission-oriented organizations. Yet it may be worthwhile to
take a look at those differences, in particular the way organizations are
financed: While profit-oriented organizations usually have to survive on
the proceeds from their business, many mission-oriented organizations
are run as non-government organizations or associations that essentially
depend on donations. For them, the scandal caused by bad workers may
hence also have considerable negative consequences for their funding, thus
making deterrence of bad workers all the more important.
Another aspect that needs to be discussed is the effect of control on
the intrinsic motivation of good workers. There is a recent literature
on the crowding out of intrinsic motivation by extrinsic incentives or
control.26 Taking into account such effects would mean that the more
the mission-oriented sector N increases monitoring in order to prevent
damage from bad workers, the lower would be the intrinsic motivation of
good workers. N would therefore also have to increase his monetary effort
incentives tN in order to induce good workers to work hard enough, thus
losing its cost advantage. Eventually, good intrinsic motivation would
disappear all together and organizations in sector N would operate under
26See Seabright (2009), Frey and Jegen (2001), Frey and Oberholzer-Gee (1997).
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the same conditions as firms in the profit-oriented sector F and also offer
the same contracts.
IV. Job Assignment with Multivariate Skills
IV.1. Introduction
Under which circumstances can performance in one job act as an indi-
cator for performance in another job? Why would an employer want an
employee to work first in job 1 before letting him do job 2? Two ex-
planations seem plausible: (i) worker selection: By observing a worker’s
performance in job 1, the employer learns more about the worker’s abil-
ity; and (ii) training: Working in job 1 provides the worker with training
and skills that are useful in job 2.
In the following, I concentrate on the first option. To do so, I abstract
from any considerations concerning wage costs or workers’ incentives to
exert effort. Instead, I focus on the employer’s task assignment problem
when workers differ in their skills and tasks require different combinations
of skills. Workers in the model are characterized by a skill combination
(x, z) where x and z are two different skills that are independently dis-
tributed across the worker population. However, a worker’s skill profile is
not directly observable, but only his overall performance in a given task.
The employer therefore faces the problem of how to allocate workers to
tasks that put different weights on both skills.
Although there is a lot of literature on job assignment, as nicely sum-
marized in Sattinger (1993), this problem has not been considered in this
form. Most papers on the topic assume that workers’ ability varies along
a single dimension (“general ability”) but do not take into account that
workers may possess many skills that matter for their performance. Some
others note that workers may have a comparative advantage in one task,
but then often reduce the analysis to a problem with only two types.
Allowing for several skill-dimensions, the first part of the paper an-
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alyzes the task assignment of current and new workers if the employer
faces no constraints concerning the number of workers he can assign to
each task. I derive rules for optimal assignment and show that there
may be a tradeoff between maximizing short-term and long-term output
when new workers are hired for two periods: in the short run, output
is maximized by assigning new workers to the task where the expected
output of an unscreened worker is maximal. But especially if this task
plays a much more important role in the overall production of the firm,
the employer may prefer to first hire workers for the other task, which
is thus used as a screening stage for maximizing output in the long run.
That is, the employer will prefer to forego some first period output in
order to make more informed choices in the long run.
However, firms often need a fixed number of workers in each task,
i.e., there is a given number of jobs in each activity. Given such slot
constraints, the second part of the paper determines under what circum-
stances workers are reallocated between jobs.
The analysis provides theoretical evidence for a variant of the Peter
Principle, after Peter and Hull (1969), which states that workers are pro-
moted up to their level of incompetence. In the present model, something
similar may arise over a certain range of output realizations: workers
producing output in this range will get reallocated although, at least in
expected terms, they will be less productive at their new job. Neverthe-
less, the reallocation of these workers is efficient: when the employer has
to fill an open position, he prefers to reallocate a mediocre worker on
whom he has at least some information rather than hiring an unknown
worker.
Other papers on the Peter Principle are Fairburn and Malcomson
(2001), Faria (2000) and Lazear (2004), which is closest to the present
paper. Lazear (2004) explains the Peter Principle as follows: if only the
best get promoted out of a job, then, after promotion, those left behind
are perceived as less capable. By contrast, I show that workers may
get reallocated in the first place although they are expected to be less
competent after reallocation. Rather than being a statistical artefact, the
Peter Principle hence arises as a by-product of incomplete information
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about job candidates.
The following section describes the optimal task assignment of workers
when there are two tasks that require two skills, and there are no slot
constraints. This latter assumption is relaxed in Section IV.3, which
analyzes under which circumstances workers are reallocated between jobs
if there is a fixed number of workers needed in each job. Additionally,
Section IV.4 proposes extensions of the model such as the generalization
to J jobs and I skills, and Section IV.5 discusses assignment patterns
such as job rotation. Section IV.6 concludes.
IV.2. Optimal Task Assignment
Suppose there are two kinds of activities or tasks in a firm. A worker
engaged in either of these two activities produces an output yj, j = 1, 2,
according to the following production functions
y1 = a · x+ b · z
y2 = c · x+ d · z ,
where x and z are two different skills needed in both activities, although
to different extents. For example, x can be thought of as technical and
z as marketing skills. Let us assume that a > c and d > b, i.e., skill x is
more important for activity 1 and skill z for activity 2.
The skills are independently distributed in the population with x ∼
N(µx, σx) and z ∼ N(µz, σz). The employer can observe the output
produced by a worker, but not the worker’s specific skill level (x, z).
Furthermore, the employer can hire workers for 2 periods of time at most
and may reassign them after the first period. That is, upon hiring a
worker he faces a sequence of decisions as shown in Figure IV.1.
Given this simple setup, how do workers get assigned to tasks? The
next section considers the employer’s ad interim decision problem, i.e.,
it analyzes under which conditions the employer will want to reallocate
workers once he has observed their performance in one of the two activ-
ities.1 Given this analysis, Section IV.2.2 then turns to the allocation of














Figure IV.1: Time line.
new workers,2 before the possibility for lay-offs is introduced in Section
IV.2.3.
IV.2.1. Internal Reallocation of Workers
Let us first consider how an employer would reallocate a given set of
workers whose performance in either of the two activities he has observed
for one period.
I will say that it is individually efficient to reallocate an employee if
E(y2|yˆ1) > yˆ1 , (IV.1)
i.e., if the expected performance of a worker in task 2 is higher than his
observed current performance in task 1, yˆ1.
The conditional expectation of y2 given yˆ1 is






· (yˆ1 −E(y1)) . (IV.2)
For more information on the calculation of the conditional expected out-







of the term (yˆ1 − E(y1)) in (IV.2) is equal to the ratio between the co-






2That is, Section IV.2.2 analyzes the optimal allocation of workers at t = 0, as
shown in Figure IV.1.
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In order to make reassignment efficient, i.e., in order to fulfill (IV.1),
the current output yˆ1 therefore has to fulfill the following inequality:
(k1 − 1)yˆ1 ≥ k1E(y1)− E(y2) .
As a consequence, there exists a critical value y˜1 of the form




such that, if k1 > 1, then reallocation is individually efficient if the ob-
served output yˆ1 is higher than y˜1. Otherwise, for k1 < 1, reallocation is
individually efficient if yˆ1 is smaller than y˜1.
That is, if k1 > 1, i.e., if the covariance of output in the two tasks is
higher than the variance of output in task 1, the best performing workers
in task 1 are likely to be even better in task 2. If k1 < 1, then the worst
performers in task 1 are likely to be better in task 2.
By a similar reasoning, a reallocation from task 2 to task 1 is indi-
vidually efficient if the worker’s task 2 output is higher (lower) than a
critical output level















By definition, one has
k1 · k2 =
(Cov(y1, y2))
2
V ar(y1) · V ar(y2)
= %2y1y2 .
Since the correlation coefficient %y1y2 can be at most equal to one, it
follows directly that the variables k1 and k2 cannot both at the same
time be larger than 1.
Therefore the following proposition holds:
Proposition 6: For k1 > 1, there exists a critical task 1 output level
y˜1 as defined in (IV.3) such that for y1 > y˜1 it is individually efficient to
reallocate a worker from task 1 to task 2. At the same time, there exists
a critical task 2 output level y˜2 as defined in (IV.4) such that for y2 < y˜2
it is individually efficient to reallocate workers from task 2 to task 1.
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As a corollary to this proposition, we get that if k2 > 1, then it
is individually efficient to reallocate workers with an observed output
yˆ1 < y˜1 to task 2 and workers with yˆ2 > y˜2 to task 1.
Furthermore the case may arise that k1 < 1 and k2 < 1, and hence
only the worst performers get reallocated, i.e., workers with yˆ1 < y˜1
and with yˆ2 < y˜2. This result also holds when the covariance between
tasks 1 and 2 is negative. However, both these cases are not particularly
interesting. Therefore I focus on cases where either k1 or k2 is greater
than one.
IV.2.2. Assignment of New Workers
So far, the reallocation of current workers has been considered. But how
about new workers? To which task should they be first allocated? There
are two criteria that may possibly play a role: (i) Which task provides
the employer with more precise information about the employee? (ii)
Where can an unscreened worker be expected to produce more?
If new workers get hired for only one period, then learning about the
employee obviously does not play a role, and the employer will therefore
prefer to allocate new workers to the task where the expected output
of an unknown worker is higher, and thus the second motive dominates.
The same is true if workers get hired for several periods but cannot be
reallocated or fired.
If workers instead get hired for two periods and reallocation is possi-
ble, then there may be a tradeoff between the two motives, i.e., between
learning and output maximization of unscreened workers. To see this,
let us assume that E(y1) > E(y2), i.e., an unscreened worker is expected
to be more productive in task 1. The employer can hire the worker for
either of the two tasks j = 1, 2. After one period of work, he will observe
the worker’s first period output y˜j. According to the rules derived in
the previous section, he will then either let the worker continue to work
on his current task or he will reassign him. Assuming that k1 > 1 and
k2 < 1, this means that workers first assigned to task 1 get reallocated
to task 2 if y˜1 greater than y˜1, as defined in (IV.3), and task 2 workers



















Figure IV.2: Hiring strategies for new workers (k1 > 1, k2 < 1).
workers continue to work on the same task. Figure IV.2 illustrates these
considerations.
From an ex ante point of view, the expected output of a worker hired
for two periods and first assigned to task 1 therefore is
E(y1) + [E(y1|y˜1 < y˜1) · Prob(y˜1 ≤ y˜1)] + [E(y2|y˜1 > y˜1) · Prob(y˜1 > y˜1)],
i.e., the worker’s expected first period production in task 1 plus his second
period output conditional on his observed performance y˜1 in the first
period. Note that a worker’s performance at a given task does not change
over time, that is his second period output in task 1 is the same as in
the first period, y˜1. His expected second period performance in task 2
is given by (IV.2). Taking this into account, one can rewrite the above
expression as
E(y1) + [y1 · Prob(y1 ≤ y˜1)] + [E(y2) + k1(y1 −E(y1))] · Prob(y1 > y˜1) .
Let F (·) be the cumulative distribution function according to which y1 is
distributed.3 Then the expected output of a worker hired for two periods
is
E(y1) + [F (y˜1)] + [E(y2) + k1(1− F (y˜1))− k1E(y1)] . (IV.5)
3Given the assumptions about x and z, y1 is normally distributed with mean




A similar reasoning applies when workers first work on task 2. After
observing their first period performance y˜2, the employer will reassign
them to task 1 if y˜2 ≤ y˜2 and otherwise let them continue to work on
task 2. From an ex ante point of view the expected output of a worker
hired for two periods and first assigned to task 2 hence is
E(y2) + [E(y1|y˜2 < y˜2) · Prob(y˜2 ≤ y˜2)] + [E(y2|y˜2 > y˜2) · Prob(y˜2 > y˜2)]
= E(y2) + [E(y1) + k2(y2 − E(y2))] · Prob(y˜2 ≤ y˜2) + [y2 · Prob(y˜2 > y˜2)] .
Let G(·) be the cumulative distribution function of y2.
4 Then the above
expression can be rewritten as
E(y2) + [E(y1) + k2G(y˜2)− k2E(y2)] + [1−G(y˜2)] . (IV.6)
When comparing (IV.5) and (IV.6), i.e., the expected payoffs from
assigning a worker first to task 1 or to task 2, respectively, the second











Recall that k1 = Cov(y1, y2)/V ar(y1) and k2 = Cov(y1, y2)/V ar(y1).
Whether it is better first to assign a worker to task 1 or to task 2 thus
depends on the exact distributions of y1 and y2, which in turn depend on
the distribution of skills x and z.
Proposition 7: The employer will prefer to assign new workers first
to task 2 if condition (IV.7) is fulfilled.
The employer thus prefers to sacrifice a certain amount of first-period pro-
duction in order to have more information on workers that are assigned
to the task that is likely to generate a higher output. This tradeoff is sim-
ilar to the one described in Grossman, Kihlstrom, and Mirman (1977),
who show that individuals or firms may find it profitable to modify their
behavior in order to base their future decisions on better information.
That is, they experiment in order to gain information.




The same is true in the present model. It would seem natural that the
employer should assign workers to the job where they can be expected to
produce the highest output. However, if task 1 is sufficiently more im-
portant than task 2, or if performance in task 2 is much more informative
about workers’ skills, then the employer may find it worthwhile to assign
workers first to task 2, thus basically buying information on workers at
the cost of a lower expected output in the short run. Or in the terms of
the model by Grossman, Kihlstrom, and Mirman (1977): the employer
decides to “experiment” if the benefits from more informed future choices
outweigh the costs incurred because he modifies his behavior relative to
what would be optimal if there was no learning.
Note, however, that, while it is possible that such “experimentation”
arises, it is not necessarily the case. Depending on the exact distributions
of y1 and y2, it may very well be the case that E(y1) > E(y2) and at
the same time condition (IV.7) is not fulfilled. That is, there is not
necessarily a tradeoff between maximizing the first period output of an
unknown worker and learning about his skills. In that case, the employer
will be better off assigning new workers to task 1 where they are expected
to produce a higher output.
IV.2.3. Firing
Another option not yet considered so far is to fire workers if their perfor-
mance is too low. If there are no turnover costs,5 the employer will want
to replace workers whose observed performance in task y˜j is below the
expected performance of a new worker E(yj).
6
That is, given their first period performance and assuming that k1 > 1
and k2 < 1, workers get assigned according to the following rules:
• A worker with observed performance y˜1 in task 1 will be reallocated
to task 2 if y˜1 > y˜1. He will continue to work on task 1 if E(y1) <
5Also, wage costs are not taken into account here.
6Note that if y˜j < E(yj), then also E(y−j |y˜j) < E(y−j). That is, if a worker is a
less than average performer in one task, then his expected output in the other task is
also lower than that of a new worker.
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y˜1 ≤ y˜1, and he will be fired if y˜1 ≤ E(y1).
• A worker with observed performance y˜2 in task 2 will continue to
work on task 2 if y˜2 > y˜2. He will be reallocated to task 1 if
E(y2) < y˜2 ≤ y˜2, and he will be fired if y˜2 ≤ E(y2).
Given these assignment rules and applying the same reasoning as in the
previous section, the ex ante expected payoff of hiring a worker initially
for task 1 hence is
E(y1) + [F (y˜1)− F (E(y1))] + [E(y2) + k1(1− F (y˜1))− k1E(y1)] ,(IV.8)
whereas the ex ante payoff of first assigning him to task 2 is
E(y2) + [E(y1) + k2(G(y˜2)−G(E(y2)))− k2E(y2)] + [1−G(y˜2)] .(IV.9)
From the comparison of these two options arises the following propo-
sition:
Proposition 8: The employer will prefer to assign new workers first











−F (E(y1)) + k2G(E(y2)) . (IV.10)
That is, it depends again on the entire distribution of possible outputs
in both tasks whether new workers should first be assigned to task 1 or
2.
IV.3. Job Assignment in the Short Term
The previous section has established criteria for assigning both new and
old workers to one of two activities in the firm. These criteria are relevant
if the employer faces no constraints concerning the number of employees
working on each task. However, the employer may not be able to assign
any number of workers to any task. At least in the short run he is likely
to face slot constraints in the sense that he needs a fixed number of
employees in each activity.
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Let us assume that the firm needs n workers to do task 1 and m
workers for task 2. That is, there are n jobs of type 1 and m jobs of type








i.e., the principal wants to maximize the sum of outputs. In the following,
only the employer’s short term perspective is considered, i.e., he wants to
maximize the sum of outputs in the next period. To fill all available slots,
the employer can either reallocate current workers or hire new unscreened
workers for either of the two jobs. So when does the firm choose which
option?
IV.3.1. External Recruiting vs. Internal Reallocation
Suppose the firm has to fill one open position in job 2. Should it fill the
position in job 2 with someone who has worked in job 1 before, or should
it hire an unknown worker?
If the firm promotes worker i from job 1 to job 2 and fills the opening







i.e., the sum of the expected output of an unknown worker in job 1 and
the expected output of worker i in job 2, conditional on his observed
performance yˆi1 in his current job.
If the firm does not promote worker i and hires an unknown worker
for job 2, its expected profits are
yˆi1 + E(y2) ,
i.e., worker i will continue to produce the same output yˆi1 as before, and
the new worker has expected job 2 output E(y2).
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⇔ E(y1) + E(y2) + k1(yˆ
i
1 − E(y1)) > yˆ
i
1 + E(y2)
⇔ (k1 − 1)yˆ
i
1 > (k1 − 1)E(y1) .
As before, one has to distinguish two cases: If k1 > 1, then promotion is
profitable for yˆi1 > E(y1). In the opposite case, i.e., if k1 < 1, promotion
is only profitable if the current output is below the expected output in
this job, i.e., if yˆi1 < E(y1). The analogue reasoning applies for job 2.
Proposition 9: For k1 > 1, rather than hiring a new worker, the
employer prefers to reallocate a current worker from job 1 to job 2 if his
output yˆ1 > E(y1), and from job 2 to job 1 if yˆ2 < E(y2).
As a corollary, we get that for k2 > 1 reallocation from job 1 to 2 is
profitable if yˆ1 < E(y1) and from job 2 to 1 if yˆ2 > E(y2).
7
IV.3.2. The Peter Principle: Inefficient reallocation?
When we compare the results on reassignment under slot constraints
from the previous section with the optimal assignment rules derived in
Section IV.2, it becomes clear that the two assignment rules do not always
coincide: Proposition 6 tells us that a worker currently employed in job
1 can be expected to produce a higher output in job 2 if his output is
greater than y˜1 as defined in (IV.3). Hence reassigning him is individually
efficient if his observed output y˜1 exceeds y˜1. However, this criterium
turns out not to be decisive when there is a fixed number of slots to fill and
hiring of outside candidates is possible. Then, according to Proposition
9, workers with an above average output, i.e., with yˆ1 > E(y1), are
candidates for reallocation.
If we assume that E(y1) > E(y2), then y˜1 > E(y1) (see Figure IV.3).
That is, workers producing output y˜1 > y˜1 > E(y1) are candidates for
7If both k1 and k2 are smaller than one, then reallocation is profitable for yˆ1 <








Figure IV.3: Individual efficiency and profitability of reallocation for
k1 > 1.
reallocation according to Proposition 9, even though they are likely to
produce a higher output in their current job.
This immediately brings to mind the well-known Peter Principle,8
which states that workers get promoted up to their level of incompetence.
If this principle applies in the present model, then after reallocation, there
must be some workers who are less competent or less productive at their
new job than they were at their previous job. As we have seen, this may
indeed be the case. Workers producing output between E(y1) and y˜1 are
candidates for reallocation since they produce an above-average output.
However, their expected output after reallocation E(y2|yˆ1) is smaller than
their current observed output yˆ1. That is, at least in expected terms, they
will produce less after reallocation. In other words: given their observed
performance in job 1, these workers are likely to be more productive
or “more competent” at their current job. Nevertheless, they may get
transferred to job 2. The model therefore predicts indeed that there are
some workers who get reallocated although they can be expected to be
less productive or less competent afterwards, as suggested by the Peter
Principle.
There is some previous literature on the Peter Principle. For example,
Fairburn and Malcomson (2001) discuss how promotions can limit the
effect of influence activities of workers and show that depending on the
degree of risk aversion, promotions may take place that are not justified
8After Peter and Hull (1969).
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by reasons of job assignment (what the authors refer to as the “Peter
Principle effect”). In Lazear (2004), the Peter Principle is explained
as a regression to the mean. After promoting the best job 1 workers,
the average performance of job 1 workers left behind is lower than it
was before. That is, ability appears lower after promotion purely as a
statistical matter.
The present model proposes a different explanation. It shows that
workers get promoted as soon as they produce more than the average
unscreened worker, even if they are likely to be less able and hence less
productive after promotion. This is due to the fact that the employer
faces an opportunity cost of hiring an unknown worker, and therefore
always prefers to fill an open position with a worker on whom he has at
least some (positive) information.
Note however, that this is an efficient assignment policy. The Peter
Principle thus occurs as a by-product of a labor market where workers’
skills are difficult to assess. If the employer’s information on outside
candidates improves, the scope for individually inefficient job assignment
diminishes.
IV.4. Extensions of the Model
IV.4.1. Generalization
The basic model described above can be further generalized to encompass
both more tasks and skills, as well as external shocks: suppose that there
are j = 1, .., J possible tasks and i = 1, .., I skills. Each skill has a
different weight cij in each task. Furthermore let yj denote the output in




cij · xi + j ,
where xi denotes the endowment of a worker with skill i, and  is a
noise term. I assume that skills are independently distributed in the
population according to N(µxi, σxi). The noise term is also assumed to
be independently distributed according to N(0, σ).
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This generalization allows for external productivity shocks, which
makes it better comparable to existing models of job assignment. The
analysis from the previous section also applies to this more general ver-
sion of the model: given an observed output in job j, yˆj, the expected
output of a worker in job −j is
E(y−j|yˆj) = E(y−j) +
Cov(yj, y−j)
V ar(yj)
· [yˆj − E(yj)] .
This expected output in job −j is greater than his current output in







· E(yj)− E(y−j) . (IV.11)
That is, if the above inequality holds, then the individual worker in ques-
tion will in expected terms be more productive after reallocation, i.e., it
is individually efficient to reallocate him.
If the firm has to decide between reallocating a current worker or










Suppose that Cov(yj, y−j) > V ar(yj). In that case, a worker can be
expected to be more productive in job −j than in his current job j if his






Cov(yj, y−j)− V ar(yj)
.
Furthermore, from (IV.12) it follows, that reallocation is preferable over
outside hiring if yˆj > E(yj).
Assuming that jobs j = 1, .., J are ordered in such a way that the
expected output of an unscreened worker is higher for a job with a lower
index, E(yj) is smaller than y˜j, such that workers producing output be-
tween these two values are candidates for reallocation even though they
are expected to be less productive after being reassigned. That is, the
Peter Principle as explained above still holds in the generalized version
of the model: after reallocation, there may be some workers that are less
productive at their new job than at their previous job.
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IV.4.2. Long-Term Perspective
In the analysis above, the employer was assumed to maximize output in
the next period. He did not care about the longer-term implications of
hiring a new worker in either of the two jobs existing in the firm. This
could be due either to a strong present bias or because he is unable to
assess the possibilities of employing new workers for a second period.
If, however, the employer does take a long-term perspective and he
decides between hiring a new worker in t = 1 or reallocating an old
worker, the employer would also have to take into account the expected
output of the new worker in t = 2, given the likely assignment possibilities
in that period. Ultimately this would lead to a kind of overlapping-
generations model similar to the one in Meyer (1994), who analyzes the
optimal task assignment of young and old workers in team production.
IV.5. Job Design
In the model presented here, the employer can only learn more about a
worker’s type if he assigns the worker to different jobs. This raises the
questions how an employer wants to structure a possible career path. Will
consecutive jobs be closely related to each other? When is job rotation
a useful mechanism?
Consider the following specification of the model: There are four jobs
that use four different skills as follows:
y1 = c11x1 + c12x2
y2 = c22x2 + c23x3
y3 = c33x3 + c34x4
y4 = c41x1 + c42x2 + c43x3 + c44x4
Suppose that job 4 is a management job. In order to choose candidates for
this job, the employer faces the option of letting a worker move gradually
through jobs 1,2 and 3, i.e., structure his career path as a job ladder. Or
he may want to let workers do job 1 and 3 before moving them to job 4,
i.e., implement a job rotation between quite different jobs (1 and 3).
The latter structure allows the employer to extract the most infor-
mation about the worker in just two time periods. However, switching a
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job 1 worker to job 3 promises the same expected job 3 output as hiring
a completely new worker for the job. Also, by letting a worker work his
way through job 1 to 3, the employer gets more observations and hence
a better estimate of the worker’s skills.
A job ladder hence provides the employer with a more thorough can-
didate screening, but it also takes more time. A job rotation programm,
by contrast, is a speedier way to collect some information about aspiring
managers, though at the cost of possibly getting a very low performance
of workers in job 3.
This cost can however be mitigated if the employer has better infor-
mation about workers before hiring them for a job rotation program. Sup-
posing workers can signal their skills through education, previous work,
extracurricular activities and so on, workers with good signals from vari-
ous fields therefore seem to be more likely to be selected into job rotation
schemes, such as, for example, high-profile trainee programs.9
Of course, the analysis in this paper also neglects a second aspect
that may play an important role here, namely that the structuring of a
career path also affects the learning process of the employee. This aspect
is analyzed in Gibbons and Waldman (2004), who introduce task-specific
human capital that is acquired through learning by doing.10 Reallocating
workers to similar jobs, i.e., specialization, hence makes the most efficient
use of this capital. However, for a manager it may be more important
to be somewhat knowledgeable in several fields than being an expert in
just one, which would explain the existence of job rotation.
So which of these two explanations - learning by the employer or
learning by the employee - goes the longer way in explaining why firms
adopt job rotation practices? The papers by Ortega (2001) and Eriksson
9This would correspond to the results of the studies by Campion, Cheraskin, and
Stevens (1994) and Kusunoki and Numagami (1998) which both suggest that rotation
may be good for a worker’s career and possibly is used to generate the promotion pool
for new managers.
10Note that this is an important difference to the present model, where workers’
skill levels are given from the outset and at best may be improved through learning
by doing.
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and Ortega (2006) try to shed light on exactly this question.11 While
they find evidence that both employer and employee learning may play a
role, the evidence for the former seems slightly stronger. In particular the
authors find that tenure in the firm has a significant negative effect on
rotation, whereas tenure in the industry does not, thus suggesting that
rotation is rather a means to get to know the employee than a training
device. Furthermore, firms with more hierarchy levels and broader re-
cruiting strategies, as well as growing firms, are more likely to adopt job
rotation, all of which supports the employer learning hypothesis.
IV.6. Conclusion
The paper proposed a simple task assignment model with multidimen-
sional skills and derived conditions, under which the employer can in-
crease output by reallocating workers. However, there is a potential
tradeoff between short-term output maximization and learning about the
employee’s skills. If one task is sufficiently important then the employer
may be interested in choosing workers for this task in a more sophisti-
cated way. For instance, he can get more information on these workers
by first assigning them to another task with lower expected output, thus
reducing his short-run expected output for the sake of making a more
informed choice in the future.
While this first part of the paper thus looked at the optimal assign-
ment of a given worker if the employer is free to assign him to any task
he sees fit, the second part considered a setting where the employer has
to fill a given job with a worker which he may choose from within or out-
side the firm. In such a setting, workers may get reassigned to another
job even if, in expectation, they will be less productive after reassign-
ment. This simply arises because employers prefer to reallocate workers
on whom they have some information rather than hire completely new
workers on the market.
11Ortega (2001) and Eriksson and Ortega (2006) also identify a third motive for job
rotation, namely motivating employees by mitigating boredom. However, they find
little evidence in support of this motive.
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The paper thus provides a new explanation for the Peter Principle:
workers may indeed get reallocated in such a way that, in the end, they
are actually less suited for their current than for their previous job. How-
ever, this policy is efficient, since the employer otherwise has to fill his
open positions with new applicants on whom he has less information than
on his current workers. The Peter Principle thus arises as a by-product of
insufficient knowledge about outside candidates and its relevance varies
with the availability of information on workers.
Whether this effect plays a role therefore depends crucially on the
transparency of the relevant labor market. The transparency of the la-
bor market, in turn, and hence the information available on candidates
depends on market structures, the degree of competition and the avail-
ability of reliable signals on workers’ capabilities. While these aspects are
beyond the current model, it may be interesting to explore them further.
82
Appendix A
A.1. Authority Structures and Utility Levels
A.1.1. Principal’s Utility
Area I: follows directly from Table II.1.
Area II: The expected utility1 under P-authority can be rewritten as
E[uIIP ] = E[u
II
A ] + qP [β¯B − cP − qA(B − cP )] .
The second term is greater than zero since in area II qA < (β¯B−cP )/(B−
cP ) holds. Hence the principal gets higher expected utility under P-
authority.
Area III: The expected utility under A-authority can be rewritten
as
E[uIIIA ] = E[u
III
P ] + (1− qA)qP (β¯B − cP ) .
Since the second term is greater than zero, the principal gets higher
expected utility under A-authority.
Area IV : Rewrite the expected utilities as follows:
E[uIVA ] = qA(B − cP ) + qP (β¯B − cP )− qAqP (β¯B − cP )
E[uIVP ] = qA(B − cP ) + qP (β¯B − cP )− qAqP (B − cP ) .
1To keep notation short, in this section only, the lower index indicates who has
the authority to initiate a project. While this is quite an abuse of notation since,
originally, the lower index indicates whose utility we are talking about, we still use
this notation here for the sake of shortness.
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By Assumption 1, we know that B− cP > β¯B− cP . Hence the expected
utility under A-authority is higher.
Area V : Consider the expected utility under P-authority:
E[uVP ] = qA(B − cP ) > β¯B − cP ,
since qA > (β¯B− cP )/(B− cP ) in area V . Compare this to the expected
utility under A-authority:
E[uVA ] = qP (β¯B − cP ) .
Since qP ≤ 1, the expected utility under P-authority is higher or at least
as high as under A-authority.
Area V I:The expected utility under P-authority can be rewritten as
E[uV IP ] = E[u
V I
A ] + (1− qP )qA(B − cP ) .
Since the last term is greater than zero, the expected utility under P-
authority is higher.
A.1.2. Agent’s Utility
Area I: follows directly from Table II.2.
Area II: The expected utility under P-authority can be rewritten as
E[uIIP ] = E[u
II
A ] + qP [b− cA − qA(α¯b− cA)] .
If the term in square brackets is greater than zero, the agent’s expected
utility is higher under P-authority, i.e. if




By Assumption 1, we know that b − cA > α¯b − cA, and hence that the
left hand side is greater than one, whereas the right hand side cannot
be greater than one since qA is a probability. Therefore the inequality
is fulfilled, and we have shown that the agent’s expected utility under
P-authority is higher.
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Area III: The expected utility under A-authority can be rewritten
as
E[uIIIA ] = E[u
III
P ] + (1− qA)qP (b− cA) + (1− qA)(1− qP )(−cA)
= E[uIIIP ] + (1− qA)[qP b− cA] .
Since qP > cA/b in area III, the last term in square brackets is greater
than zero. Therefore the expected utility under A-authority is higher.
Area IV : Rewrite the expected utilities as follows:
E[uIVA ] = qP (b− cA) + qA(α¯b− cA)− qAqP (b− cA)− (1− qA)(1− qP )cA
E[uIVP ] = qP (b− cA) + qA(α¯b− cA)− qAqP (α¯b− cA) .
By assumption 1, we know that b − cA > α¯b − cA. Hence the expected
utility under P-authority is higher.
Area V : Consider the expected utility under A-authority:
E[uVA] = qP b− cA > α¯b− cA ,
since qP > α¯ in area V . Compare this to the expected utility under
P-authority:
E[uVP ] = qA(α¯b− cA) .
Since qA ≤ 1, the expected utility under A-authority is higher or at least
as high as under P-authority.
Area V I: The agent prefers P-authority if
qP (b− cA) + (1− qP )qA(α¯b− cA) > qP b− cA
−qP cA + (1− qP )qA(α¯b− cA) > −cA
(1− qP )cA + (1− qP )qA(α¯b− cA) > 0
cA + qA(α¯b− cA) > 0 .
Since the term in brackets is positive, the inequality is fulfilled, and hence
the agent prefers P-authority.
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A.2. Reversing the Game Structure - Payoffs
A.2.1. Payoffs for A-authority over project choice
If the agent has both the authority to initiate and to implement a project,
the players’ ex ante expected payoffs are:
Case AA1: qP >
α¯b−cA
b−cA
E[uA] = qP (b− cA)
E[uP ] = qP (β¯B − cP ) .
Case AA2: qP <
α¯b−cA
b−cA
E[uA] = qA(α¯b− cA) + (1− qA)qP (b− cA)
E[uP ] = qA(B − cP ) + (1− qA)qP (β¯B − cP )
A.2.2. Payoffs for P-authority over project choice
If the principal has the authority to initiate a project and the agent has
the authority to implement it, the players’ ex ante expected payoffs are:
Case PA1: qA ≤ β
E[uA] = qP (b− cA)
E[uP ] = qP (β¯B − cP )
Case PA2: β < qA ≤ cP/B The payoff matrix and the ex ante ex-
pected payoffs in this case are identical to the previous one.
Case PA3: cP/B < qA ≤ β¯
E[uA] = qP (b− cA) + (1− qP )qA(α¯b− cA)
E[uP ] = qP (β¯B − cP ) + (1− qP )qA(B − cP ) + (1− qP )(1− qA)(−cP )
Case PA4: β¯ < qA
E[uA] = qA(α¯b− cA)
E[uP ] = qAB − cP
We then have to compare the respective expected utilities. The results
of this comparison are shown in Figure A.1.
In order to get a picture that is comparable to Figure II.5, we have


































Figure A.1: Preferred authority structure by areas when A draws last
A.3. Endogenizing the Game Structure - Principal’s preferences
Case 1: q˜P < cA/b
Let us start with the area where qP < q˜P . Here, we have to compare
PP-authority (cases I and II) with AA-authority (VII, VIII and IX). P’s
utility in the latter case is
qA(B − cP ) + (1− qA)qP (β¯B − cP ) , (A.1)
which is always greater than P’s utility in case I as given by
qA(B − cP ) . (A.2)
It is also greater than P’s utility in case II as given by
qP (β¯B − cP ) + (1− qP )qA(B − cP ) . (A.3)
To see this take the difference between (A.1) and (A.3) which is
qAqP [(B − cP )− (β¯B − cP )] .
By assumption 1, the term in square brackets is positive, and hence (A.1)
is greater than (A.3). Therefore the principal prefers AA-authority for
qP < q˜P .
Next, we have a look at P’s preferences for q˜P < qP < cA/b. Here
we are comparing PP-authority (cases I and II) with PA-authority (cases
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X,XI and XII). It is easy to see that (A.2) is bigger than P’s utility in
case X as given by
qAB − cP , (A.4)
i.e., PP-authority is better. In case XI, P gets
qP (β¯B − cP ) + (1− qP )qA(B − cP ) + (1− qP )(1− qA)(−cP ) . (A.5)
Taking the difference between I and XI we get
qP [qA(B − cP )− (β¯B − cP )] + (1− qP )(1− qA)cP ,
which divided by (B − cP ) equals




Since the comparison between I and XI is only relevant for β¯ > qA > q˜A,
the term in square brackets is positive, and hence also the difference
between I and XI, i.e., PP-authority is better. In case XII, P gets
qP (β¯B − cP ) . (A.6)
Again subtracting this from P’s utility in case I and dividing by (B− cP )
we get
qA − qP q˜A .
Since the comparison between I and XII is only relevant if cP/B > qA >
q˜A and qP ≤ 1, this expression is positive and hence utility in case I is
bigger than in XII, i.e., PP-authority is better.
Now let us compare case II with cases X to XII. Taking the difference
between II as given by (A.3) and X as given by (A.4), we get
qP
[
(β¯B − cP )− qA(B − cP )
]
+ (1− qA)cP .









Since the comparison between II and X is only relevant if q˜A > qA >
cP/B, the term in square brackets is positive and utility in II is higher
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than in X, i.e., PP-authority is better. The difference between case II
and XI as described by (A.5) is given by
(1− qP )(1− qA)cP ,
which is positive, i.e., utility in II is higher than in XI and PP-authority is
preferable from the principal’s point of view. Finally, it is straightforward
to see that utility in II is higher than in XII (cf. (A.6)). So we have shown
that for q˜P < qP < cA/b P prefers PP-authority.
Now, when cA/b < qP < α¯, we have to compare AP-authority (cases
III and IV) with PA-authority (cases X, XI and XII). In cases III and
IV, the principal gets
qA(B − cP ) + (1− qA)qP (β¯B − cP ) . (A.7)
It is easy to see that this is bigger that (A.4), P’s utility in case X. Utility
under AP-authority is also higher when comparing to case XI. Let us take
the difference between the (A.7) and (A.5), which is
qAqP [(B − cP )− (β¯B − cP )] + (1− qP )(1− qA)cP .
By Assumption 1 the term in square brackets is positive and hence P’s
utility under AP-authority is higher. The same is true when comparing
to case XII: The difference between (A.7) and (A.6) is
qA[(B − cP )− (β¯B − cP )] ,
which again by Assumption 1 is positive. We therefore get that P prefers
AP-authority over PA-authority when cA/b < qP < α¯.
Finally, when α¯ < qP , we have to compare PP-authority(cases V and
VI) to PA-authority (cases X to XII). P’s utility in case V is
qA(B − cP ) , (A.8)
which is obviously greater than (A.4), P’s utility in case X. Next, consider
the difference between utility in case V (cf. (A.8))and case XI (cf. (A.5)):
qP [(B − cP )− (β¯B − cP )] + (1− qP )(1− qA)cP .
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By Assumption 1 the term in square brackets is greater than zero and
therefore utility in case V is higher. Also, P’s utility in case V is higher
than in case XII (cf. (A.6)). To see this, consider the difference between
the two
qA(B − cP )− qP (β¯B − cP ) = qA − qP q˜A .
The comparison between V and XII is only relevant when cP/B > qA >
q˜A. Therefore the above expression is positive and utility in case V is
higher.
P’s utility in case VI is
qP (β¯B − cP ) + (1− qP )qA(B − cP ) , (A.9)
which is obviously greater than (A.5), P’s utility in case XI, and (A.6),
P’s utility in case XII. So we only have to check whether case VI is more
advantageous for P than case X (cf.(A.4)). Subtracting X from VI, we
get
qP [(β¯B − cP )− qA(B − cP )] + (1− qA)cP ,
which after dividing by (B − cP ) is equivalent to




Since the comparison between VI and X is only relevant if q˜A > qA > β¯,
the expression in square brackets is positive and hence utility in case
VI is higher. Therefore for α¯ < qP , P overall prefers PP-authority over
PA-authority.
Case 2: cA/b < q˜P < α¯
For qP < cA/b, we have to compare PP-authority (cases I and II) with
AA-authority (cases VII, VIII and IX). As shown above, P prefers AA-
authority under these circumstances.
For cA/b < qP < q˜P , we have to compare AP-authority (cases III and
IV) with AA-authority (cases VII, VIII and IX). It turns out that P’s
expected utility in all these cases is the same, namely
qA(B − cP ) + (1− qA)qP (β¯B − cP ) ,
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so that the principal is indifferent between these two authority structures.
For q˜P < qP < α¯, we have to compare AP-authority (cases III and
IV) with PA-authority (cases X, XI and XII). As we have seen in the last
subsection, the principal prefers AP-authority.
Finally, for α¯ < qP , we compare PP-authority (cases V and VI)
with PA-authority (cases X, XI and XII). This comparison has also al-




B.1. Proof of Proposition 1




piij = q + (∆q −mitij)(mitij + θij)
1
a
− wij −M(mi) ,
subject to
(LL) wij ≥ w ,
(PC) uij = (mitij + θij)
2/(2a) + wij ≥ u¯j .
Let λLL and λPC be the respective Lagrange multipliers of the two








+ λLL(wij − w) + λPC(wij + (mitij + θij)
2/(2a)− u¯j) ,
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and the corresponding first-order conditions are
∂L
∂wij












[∆q − 2mitij − θij + λPC(mitij + θij)]
−M ′(mi) ≤ 0 , (B.3)
∂L
∂λLL
= wij − w ≥ 0 , (B.4)
∂L
∂λPC
= wij + (mitij + θij)
2/(2a)− u¯j ≥ 0 , (B.5)
0 = λLL(wij − w) , (B.6)
0 = λPC(wij + (mitij + θij)
2/(2a)− u¯j) , (B.7)
From (B.1) follows immediately that at least one of the two con-
straints has to be binding, i.e., it is not possible that λLL = λPC = 0.
Indeed, if both λLL = λPC = 0, (B.1) implies that the profit of the prin-
cipal could be increased by reducing wij to its minimum legal level w, a
contradiction with λLL = 0.
Furthermore, if (B.2) is binding, then (B.3) cannot be, unless mi =
tij = 0. The first-order condition with respect to m is always smaller or
equal to zero, (i.e., ∂L
∂mi
≤ 0) so that the principal wants to set m as low
as possible. We deduce that m∗i = m if extrinsic incentives for effort are
needed and m∗i = 0 if no such incentives are needed.
We then get three cases:
Case I: (LL) binding, (PC) not binding
If the (LL) constraint is binding then λLL > 0 and wij = w. If the
(PC) is not binding then λPC = 0. By assumption 3, namely that
∆q2 ≥ 4aM(m), the principal always wants to induce some effort from
the worker. Extrinsic incentives are necessary only if θij is small. To be
more specific, from (B.2) it follows that mitij = max{0, (∆q − θij)/2} is
optimal.
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The principal’s payoff then is












−M(m) if ∆q ≥ θij
,
and the agent’s payoff is




θ2ij if ∆q < θij
(∆q + θij)
2/4 if ∆q ≥ θij
,
In the limit, if the agent’s reservation utility is equal to this payoff, his





max{0, (∆q − θij)/2}+ θij
)2
+ w .
This means that Case I is only relevant when the agent’s reservation
utility is u¯j ∈ [0, v(θij)].
Case II: (LL) binding, (PC) binding
If the (LL) constraint is binding (λLL > 0), then wij = w. If the
(PC) is also binding (λPC > 0), then from (B.5) follows that mitij =√
2a(u¯j − w) − θij is optimal. For this to be a solution, it is necessary
that mitij ≥ 0 which is equivalent to u¯j ≥ w +
θ2ij
2a
. The agent’s payoff is
by construction
uij = u¯j .
The principal’s payoff is








2a(u¯j − w)−M(m) .
It is easy to check that piIij = pi
II
ij if u¯j = v(θij).
Case III: (LL) not binding, (PC) binding
If the (PC) constraint is binding (λPC > 0), then wij = u¯j − (mitij +
θij)
2/(2a).
If the (LL) constraint is not binding (λLL = 0), then wij > w. This
implies in (B.1) an interior solution so that λPC = 1. We deduce that if
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mi = m > 0, by (B.2), we get mitij = ∆q. Plugging that into the partic-
ipation constraint which is binding we get wij = u¯j − (∆q + θij)
2/(2a).
Note that for this it has to hold that u¯j − (∆q + θij)
2/(2a) > w > 0.






2 + w .
The principal’s payoff then is









which, under the assumption that ∆q2 ≥ 4aM(m), is higher than the
profit achieved without monitoring (i.e., without extrinsic incentives piij =




2]). The agent’s payoff is by construction
uij = u¯j .






2 + q −M(m) .
Finally comparing piIIij with pi
III





iff u¯j = v˜(θij). The principal prefers Case III over Case II whenever the
agent’s outside utility exceeds v˜(θij).
This means that Case III is relevant when the agent’s reservation
utility is u¯j ∈ [v˜(θij), v¯(θij)], that case II is relevant when the agent’s
reservation utility is u¯j ∈ [v(θij), v˜(θij)], and that Case I is relevant when
the agent’s reservation utility is u¯j ∈ [0, v(θij)].
To finish the proof, we have to make sure that the principal’s payoff
from each scenario is positive. For this, q−w−M(m) > 0 is a sufficient
assumption. It also ensures that v(θij) ≤ v˜(θij) ≤ v¯(θij). QED
B.2. Calculating the Level of Automatic Deterrence in N
In order to calculate the level of automatic deterrence in N , ˜˜θb, we have















Case IuFb(e) = w +
∆q2
8a
Case IIuFb(e) = u¯
Case IIIuFb(e) = u¯ vN
v˜N
v¯N













Figure B.1: Bad workers’ utility from positive effort in F (i.e., uFb(e))
and negative effort in N (i.e., uNb(d)) for θg > ∆q.
is equivalent to comparing the utility of a bad worker from effort e in F
with his utility from effort d in N .
Let us first consider the case where θg > ∆q. Depending on the level
of reservation utility of the agents, Figure B.1 indicates which of the cases
derived in Corollaries 1 and 2 is relevant in each sector and summarizes
the resulting utility levels uNb(d) and uFb(e) that can be achieved by bad
workers. We then have to compare each possible combination of utility
levels in order to determine the relevant level of automatic deterrence.
For instance, Case Ib in sector N overlaps with cases I, II and III in sector
F . If we insert the relevant values for mN , tN , wN as well as mF , tF , wF




vF < u¯ < vN .
Similar comparisons have to be made for the remainder of cases, as
well as for a setting where θg < ∆q.
B.3. Proof of Proposition 2
The solution to the principal’s maximization problem with full deterrence
of bad workers is similar to the solution in the benchmark model. We
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can formulate the following Lagrangian:
max
wF ,mF ,λLL,λPC
L(wF , mF , λLL, λPC)
= q + (∆q − θb +mFK) ·
θb −mFK
a
− wF −M(mF )









The corresponding first-order conditions are
∂L
∂wF











(θb −mFK) . (B.9)
Furthermore it has to hold that
0 = λLL(wF − w) (B.10)
0 = λPC(wF + (θb −mFK)
2/(2a)− u¯j) . (B.11)
As before, we get three cases:
Case I: (LL) binding, (PC) not binding
If the limited liability constraint is binding, λLL > 0, and given condition
(B.10) it follows immediately that the optimal basic wage in case I wI =
w. If the (PC) is not binding, then λPC = 0. Hence, from condition (B.9)




M ′(mF ) + 2mFK .
Case II: (LL) and (PC) binding
If both conditions are binding, then λLL > 0 and λPC > 0. Again,
by condition (B.10) we therefore have that the optimal wage in case II








Case III: (LL) not binding, (PC) binding
Since the limited liability constraint is not binding, λLL = 0 and hence
by (B.8) λPC = 1. Inserting this in (B.9), we get that the monitoring




M ′(mF ) +mFK .

















This is due to the fact that the deterrence constraint mF tF = θb −mFK
is binding.
Having calculated these three solutions, the question is, when each
of them is relevant, i.e., we have to calculate the critical values of the
agent’s outside utility delimiting the above three cases vFb, v˜Fb and v¯Fb.
Let us start with vFb which is defined as the outside utility for which




2/(2a) + wIF = u¯j ,
has to hold, and hence vFb is defined as
vFb ≡ (θb −m
I
FK)
2/(2a) + w .












θb > θ˜b. Therefore vFb > vF .
Next, let us consider v˜Fb, which defines the border between case II
and III. Case III is only relevant if u¯j − (θb − m
III
F K)
2/(2a) > w > 0.








2 + w .
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For outside values above this one, case III holds. Note that the limited
liability constraint is trivially fulfilled if u¯ > v˜Fb. Again, since we consider
only cases where θb > θ˜b and hence (θb −m
III




F , we get that
v˜Fb > v˜F .
Finally, v¯Fb is defined as the outside utility of the agent for which the
principal’s profit in case III becomes zero, i.e., for which piIIIF = 0. That
is:



















M ′(mF ) +mFK .


























K +M ′′(mIIIF )
.
This expression is smaller than zero if
(∆q − θb +m
III
F )M
′′(mIIIF ) ≤ aM
′(mIIIF ) .
We assumed that M ′(m) > 0 and M ′′(m) > 0. Since we consider only
cases where θb > θ˜b it holds that (θb−m
III




F = ∆q. Hence the
expression in brackets is negative and the above inequality is fulfilled.
We therefore know that v¯Fb is decreasing in θb.
How high is v¯Fb relative to v¯F ? Recall that










2 −∆q2]−M(mIIIF ) +M(m)









As we have seen above, v¯Fb is decreasing in θb, and the lowest value of
θb for which case III is actually relevant is θb = θ˜b = ∆q + mK. If we
plug this into the above inequality, after some simplification we find that





2 > 0 .
Since mIIIF > m and M(·) is an increasing function of m, the left-hand
side of this inequality is negative, and we hence have shown by contra-
diction that v¯Fb < v¯F must hold.
B.4. Proof of Proposition 3
The solution of the principal’s maximization problem when there are bad
workers follows the analysis in the benchmark model when there are only
good and regular workers. As we have seen, the principal’s maximization
problem without full deterrence corresponds to
max
wF ,tF ,mF







subject to the following constraints
(LL) wF ≥ w ,
(PC) (mF tF )
2/(2a) + wF ≥ u¯j .
Let again λLL and λPC be the respective Lagrange multipliers of the
two constraints for the modified optimization problem stated above. The
resulting Lagrangian is
max
wF ,mF ,tF ,λLL,λPC
L(wF , mF , tF , λLL, λPC) = q − wF −M(mF )






+ λLL(wF − w) + λPC(wF + (mF tF )
2/(2a)− u¯j) ,
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and the corresponding first-order conditions are
∂L
∂wF












[(1− βF )(∆q − 2mF tF )− λPCmF tF ]
−M ′(mF ) +
βFDK
a
= 0 . (B.14)
Furthermore, the following has to be true:
0 = λLL(wF − w) , (B.15)
0 = λPC(wF + (mF tF )
2/(2a)− u¯j) . (B.16)
Equation (B.13), i.e. ,the first-order condition with respect to tF , is
fulfilled if the expression in square brackets is equal to zero. This implies
that (B.14), the first-order condition with respect to mF , simplifies to




and hence the optimal level of monitoring without full deterrence of bad
workers is mndF is such that M
′(mndF ) = βFDK/a.
Note that no other change in extrinsic incentives is needed in order to
account for the presence of bad workers. In particular, effort incentives
for regular workers can stay at the same level. The further solution of
the problem hence runs along the same lines as the proof of Proposition
1, except that the optimal monetary transfer level tndF is adapted such








Conditional Normal Distributions: General Theorem
How to calculate the conditional expectation of x and z? A nice summary
is provided in Greene (2003): Let x = (x1, x2, · · · , xn)
′ be a vector of n
random variables with mean vector µ and covariance matrixΣ. Let x1 be
any subset of variables, and let x2 be the remaining variables. Likewise,













Then the conditional distribution of x1 given x2 is normal as well:
x1|x2 ∼ N(µ1.2,Σ11.2) ,
with
µ1.2 = µ1 + Σ12Σ
−1
22 (x2 − µ2) ,
Σ11.2 = Σ11 − Σ12Σ
−1
22 Σ21
Application to the Production Function
Since all variables in the production function
y = ax+ bz ,
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are normally distributed, we can use this theorem.1 It will be helpful to


















The covariance matrix Σˆ of this vector of normally distributed vari-
ables is calculated as AΣA′,2 where A is the matrix of constants defined



















z aσxσz + bσ
2
z







So, we have a set of normally distributed variables (x, z, y) with mean
vector (µx, µz, µy) and covariance matrix Σˆ, which we will partition into
two subsets, namely in vector (x, z)′ and (y). The mean vector and the
covariance matrix Σˆ are also partitioned accordingly, such that we can
















1It is assumed that x and z are normally distributed. Then their weighted sum y
is also normally distributed with mean µy and variance σ
2
y, which corresponds to Σ22
as calculated below.









Following the above-mentioned theorem, the expectation of x, respec-




























y − aµx − bµz
a2σ2x + b
2σ2z + 2abσxσz
This can, in turn, be used to calculate the worker’s expected output
in the second job, given his performance in the first.
With Independently Distributed Skills
If x, z are independently distributed, their covariance is zero, and the





















(y − aµx − bµz)
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